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The Application of Title VII to Law Firm Partnership
Decisions: Women Struggle to Join the Club
"If I were asked.., to what the singular prosperity and growing
strength of [the American] people ought mainly to be attributed, I should
reply: To the superiority of their women."*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history women have faced a myriad of obstacles in their attempt to
overcome the discrimination' practiced against them by the predominantly male legal
establishment.2 It was not until 1869 that Belle A. Mansfield purportedly became the
first female attorney in the United States when she succeeded in overcoming an Iowa
statute that had allowed only white males to become lawyers.3 The significance of
this development was soon diminished, however, when in 1872 the Supreme Court
adamantly rebuffed Myra Bradwell's attempt to secure admission to the Illinois Bar.4
Justice Bradley expressed a widely shared attitude toward women in the legal profes-
sion when he declared that:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of
family organizations, which is founded in the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband .... This very
incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in
rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong
to the office of an attorney and counsellor.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties,
complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to
the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases.
5
* A. DE TocQuavu.LE, DENtocRAcY IN Ash.IwcA, Part II, Book II, at 262 (1863).
1. Discrimination is defined as "the act, practice, or an instance of discriminating categorically rather than
individually." WEBsTER's THum NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCrtIONARY 648 (1967).
-2. See C. EpsTEN, Wo.mEN IN LAw 82 (1981); P. HoanttaN, LIONS IN THE STIE~r 11-12 (1973).
3. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1971).
4. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
5. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Women were undeterred by this paternalistic attitude, however, and they per-
sisted in their efforts to gain entry into the nation's professional educational and
occupational institutions. Within the last decade the number of women graduating
from the nation's law schools has significantly increased.6 The objective criteria used
by law schools to determine admission standards indicate that women applicants are
as well qualified as men to study law.7 Although the employment of women in the
legal profession has trailed their enrollment in law schools, the number of practicing
female attorneys quadrupled between 1970 and 1979. 8 As of 1981, women accounted
for over fourteen percent of all attorneys in the United States.
9
The growing number of women in the legal arena has prodded the traditionally
male legal establishment into recognizing the qualifications of female applicants and
expanding the job opportunities available to women in the profession. Sexist1" atti-
tudes and practices that prevailed within the occupation in the past in the form of
sexual harrassment, discriminatory hiring, and blatant second-class citizenship have
decreased, 1 only to be replaced by more subtle forms of discrimination. Less con-
spicuous problems now exist, stemming from a basically male institution with male
mores attempting to accommodate female perspectives and participation. 12 This new
form of sex discrimination is vividly demonstrated by the inability of female attor-
neys to succeed to the pinnacle of power, wealth, and prestige-law firm partnership.
Although increasing numbers of female attorneys are being hired, significant resis-
tance to female partnership remains.' 3
6. In 1964 there were fewer than 2,200 women (4%) enrolled in accredited law schools. In 1974 the numberofwomen
had increased to 21,788 (21%). By 1981 women accounted for 44,986 (35%) of the total number of law students enrolled in
accredited institutions. ASS'N. OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS & LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, PRELAw HANDBOOK 1982-83
11 (1982).
7. A 1972 survey of eight leading law schools discovered that over 53% of the women enrolled in law school
graduated in the top 10% of their undergraduate class, while only 38% of the men could claim such achievement. Stevens,
LawSchools andLaw Students, 59 VA. L. REv. 551,572 n.46 (1973). The average LSAT score did not vary significantly by
the student's sex.
8. Fossum, Women in the Legal Profession: A Progress Report, 67 A.B.A.J. 578, 580 (1981). The following
statistics demonstrate the increase in the total number of female attorneys:





9. About 14% of the practicing attorneys in the United States in 1981 were female. U.S. BUREAU OF'Tm CENSUS,
STATISTICAL AesRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 388, Chart No. 651 (103d ed. 1982-83). The total number of female
attorneys in the United States in 1981 was 81,921.
10. Sexism has been defined as "the tendency to behave towards and think about people purely on the grounds of
gender, to generalize about individuals and groups on the basis of their biology rather than to recognize their actual
interests and capacities." Pearson & Sachs, Barristers and Gentlemen: A Critical Look at Sexism in the Legal Profession,
43 MOD. L. REv. 400, 407-08 (1980).
11. Margolik, Wall Street's Sexist Wall, NAT'L L.J., August 4, 1980, at 58, col. 1.
12. Id.
13. Burke & Johnson, More Women on the Way Up, NAT'L L.J., April 20, 1981, at 1, col. 1. In a survey of the fifty
largest firms in the country, the following statistics were compiled:
1980
Total Attorneys (Female/Male) 1,658 women out of 10,679 (15.5% female)
Total Associates 1,537 women out of 6,408 (24.0% female)
Total Partners 121 women out of 4,271 ( 2.8% female)
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This Comment will trace one woman's struggle to become a partner at a large,
prestigious law firm and her unsuccessful efforts to convince the judiciary that Title
VII jurisdiction extends to discriminatory practices within law firms. 14 The availabil-
ity of Title VII remedies for discriminatory denial of partnership is crucial for a
substantial number of women who have served the requisite apprenticeship time
period as associates and thus will soon be seeking to become partners within their law
firms. 5 This Comment will examine the proposed application of Title VII to law
firms, the judicial reluctance to accept this theory, the remedies available if Title VII
would apply to the partnership decision, and finally, how law firms can avoid poten-
tial Title VII litigation claims.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
A. Purpose and Scope
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196416 was the first attempt by the federal
government to provide comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimination against
minorities and women in private employment. 7 Although a significant amount of
political maneuvering resulted in an unclear and peculiar legislative history, 18 the
courts have determined that Congress intended to outlaw any employment practices
that discriminate against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 19 or
national origin.20 In fulfilling this purpose courts have used Title VII to eliminate
financial disparities resulting from sex discrimination, 2 ' prevent sex stereotyping in
1979
Total Attorneys (Female/Male) 1,329 women out of 9,652 (13.8% female)
Total Associates 1,242 women out of 5,820 (21.3% female)
Total Partners 87 women out of 3,832 ( 2.3% female)
See also C. EPs-rEIn, WoNtEN iN LAW 175-218 (1981).
14. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (Ilth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
15. An associate is now considered for partnership at most large law firms after eight to ten years. Morrison,
MAKING PARTNER: TRADmoN IN FLUX, NAT'L L.J., April 12, 1982, at I, col. 4.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976).
17. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,545 (1974); See also CommentA Look at Love v. Pullman, 37 U. CHi. L. REv.
181, 181 (1969).
18. For a complete analysis of the legislative history of Title VII, see Hill, The Equal Employment OpportunityActs of
1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History andAdministration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1977);
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
19. The addition of sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination was introduced by an opponent of Title VII as a floor
amendment designed to obstruct the passage of the bill. See 110 CoNG. REc. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Congressman
Smith). Representative Smith, a principal opponent of the original bill, offered the amendment "in a spirit of satire and
ironic cajolery." Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & Cost. L. REv. 431, 441 (1966). The spirit and
intent of the amendment forced some supporters of the bill to vote against the amendment. Representative Green,
attempting to prevent the obstructionist tactics from torpedoing the entire legislation, registered her opposition to the
amendment, stating that "it will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well--be used to help destroy this section of the
bill by some of the very people who today support it. And I hope that no other amendment will be added to this bill on sex
or age or anything else, that would jeopordize our primary purpose in any way." 110 CoNG. REc. 2581 (1964) (remarks
of Representative Green).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)() (1976). See also Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir.
1970).
21. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Com'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 83
(1968).
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employment criteria,2 2 provide equal access to the job market, 23 and prohibit pro-
tectionism and paternalism.2 4
The pertinent language of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 25
Although its prohibition of discriminatory employment practices is extremely broad,
Title VII does allow an employer to take certain action based on religion, sex or
national origin when that factor is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of [a] particular business." 2 6 When considering
sex discrimination cases, however, courts consistently construe this exception nar-
rowly, requiring employers to prove the existence of a reasonable factual basis for the
discriminatory practice. 27 Sex discrimination28 is permissible only when the essence
of the business operation would be undermined by a failure to hire members of one
sex exclusively. 29 Some courts have urged a different test, whereby an employer may
utilize the bona fide occupational qualification defense to a charge of sex discrimina-
tion only when there is "reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved. '30
B. Administrative Procedures and Litigation
1. Administrative Procedures
A person alleging discrimination by an employer must generally file a timely
charge3 1 with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) within 180
22. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
24. Homemakers, Inc. of Los Angeles v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1063 (1975); Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974); Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465
F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976).
27. See generally Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 Tax. L.
REv. 1025, 1026 (1977). The EEOC guidelines provide that the bona fide occupational qualification exception shall be
strictly construed in the area of sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1982).
28. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). The EEOC guidelines help define sex discrimination by
stating "the principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and
not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1982).
29. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1981).
30. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Harriss v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The charge must be in writing and describe, under oath, the nature of the
discrimination. Id.
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days of the violation as a condition precedent to Title VII litigation. 32 Once a charge
is filed, the EEOC notifies the charged party and then conducts an investigation to
determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. If the
EEOC determines that a violation may have occurred, it must attempt to eliminate the
practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 33 A private suit by the plaintiff
can be filed only after the EEOC issues notification that either (1) the EEOC is
dismissing the charge, or (2) 180 days have passed since the filing of the charge and
the EEOC has not filed suit or concluded a conciliatory agreement.34 Upon receipt of
the EEOC's notice to sue, the plaintiff can then file a complaint in federal district
court.3 5
2. Disparate Treatment Cases
Employment discrimination claims are categorized as either disparate treatment
or disparate impact cases. 36 Disparate treatment occurs when an employer im-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--5(e) (1976). See Kryzewski v. Nashville, 584 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1978). If the alleged
violation occurs within a state that has an enforcement agency, the state agency has exclusive jurisdiction for sixty days,
and at the conclusion of that period, the plaintiff can file a charge with the EEOC. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 756 (1979). If the charge is filed in such a state, the plaintiff must file with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged violation or thirty days after receiving notice that the state agency has disposed of the case, whichever comes first.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (pendency of state proceedings does
not extend the 300 day period). For an excellent explanation and analysis of Titie VilI's procedural requirements, see
Comment, The Procedural Filing Requirements of Title VII in Deferral States: The Need for Legislative Action, 43 Ouo
ST. L.J. 675 (1982).
The plaintiff may not be able to commence suit unless a timely charge is filed with the EEOC. United Air Lines, Inc.,
v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). If systematic discrimination is alleged, however, the time limitations may not
apply because the violation continues as long as the discriminatory system is in effect. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1971). Discriminatory promotional policies may be regarded as continuing violations. See,
e.g., Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 1978); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc.,
556 F.2d 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1977); Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136, 1137 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,257 (1980) (denial
of tenure was not a continuing violation; therefore, the time limitations applied). Additionally, the present effect of a past
discriminatory act cannot furnish the basis for Title VII jurisdiction in the absence of a present violation. United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
Filing a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit because courts may apply equitable
doctrines of estoppel, tolling, and laches whenever the facts of the case merit such consideration, thus operating to revive
a claim that would otherwise be barred by a procedural technicality. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
393 (1982). Compare Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (plaintiff's filing suit in wrong forum
tolled the statute of limitations); Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 721 (6th Cir. 1980); Smith v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 105 (1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) with International Union of Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins &
Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (Title VII time period is not tolled during the pendency of grievance pro-
ceedings). See generally Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of Jurisdiction in Title
VII Suits, 67 GEO. L.J. 811 (1979).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Ass'n, 635 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1981);
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). The basic enforcement mechanism of Title VII is a private right of action
vested in the victim of discrimination. The House Committee on the Judiciary believed that enforcement in the federal
courts and not the EEOC would mean that "settlement of complaints will occur more rapidly and with greater frequency."
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. Rev. 431, 436 (1966) (citing H.R. RaP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2515-16).
35. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
798 (1973). Plaintiff has 90 days to file in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). The EEOC right to sue notice
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, and a premature action by plaintiff may be dismissed. See Gibson v. Kroger Co.,
506 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1974); Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843,
845-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1969).
36. See generally L. MODJSsKA, HANDLING EMpLYomENn DisCRINlATON CASES 10-27 (1980); B. SCHt.EI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENr DISCRIMINArION LAw 1-12 (1976). A variant of the typical employment discrimination case is
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permissibly distinguishes between persons of comparable ability. These cases involve
an employer's decision to discharge37 or refusal to employ 38 or promote39 a particular
individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of the
employer's discriminatory motive is crucial,40 although in some cases, motive may
be inferred from the mere fact of differential treatment. 4' In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green42 the United States Supreme Court provided guidelines for resolving
disparate treatment cases. The plaintiff initially must establish a prima facie case by
proving (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) that she applied and was
qualified for an available position, (3) that she was rejected, and (4) that after her
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to receive applica-
tions from persons of complainant's qualifications. 43 The burden of production then
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment practice. 44 If the employer produces a reasonable and legitimate ex-
planation supporting the validity of the practice, the plaintiff then must demonstrate
that the employer's reasons are merely a pretext for an underlying discriminatory
practice. 4
5
the pattern or practice theory, under which plaintiff must prove that the employer has systematically treated specific
individuals less fairly than others on the basis of an impermissible classification. Pattern or practice has been defined as
including "only [situations] when the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but
is repeated, routine or of a generalized nature...." " [S]ingle, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single
business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice .. " 110 CONG. REc. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey). A pattern or practice case may, for example, establish that over a period of years only men were promoted to
supervisory positions, passing over equally qualified women. See Kyriazi v. western Elee. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 902
(D.N.J. 1978). A showing of pattern or practice allows the EEOC to bring a civil action seeking appropriate relief in an
expedited hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 643 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1981) (whites warned before discharge
for excessive absenteeism, but not blacks); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263,267 (10th Cir. 1975) (Title vI
violation for black worker's discharge resulting from unfair treatment by white foreman).
38. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 (1977) (pattern orpmctice action
brought by the federal government against company with 6,472 employees of which only 5% were black and 4% were
Spanish surnamed); United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078
(1981) (prima facie case of disparate treatment shown by applicant flow statistics demonstrating large disparities between
defendant's work force and the applicant pools for blacks and women).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1348-49 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (prima facie case
established when only 5 women had tenure out of 401 faculty members, 45% of males received tenure compared to 6% of
women, and during the preceding six years, only 3 women achieved tenure while 70 of their male counterparts were given
tenure).
40. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
41. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
42. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
43. Id. at 802.
44. Id. See also Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975). In making individual employment
decisions, the employer is free to weigh each person's particular talents and performance. Id. at 423 (quoting Pond v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1974)). If the judgment of the individual is made in good faith and
not corrupted by stereotypical assumptions about the abilities of certain classes of people, the employer's judgment can be
sustained as a legitimate reason. Id. (quoting Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974)). In Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) the Court held that the employer need only articulate
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection of the employee and is not required to prove absence of a
discriminatory motive. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) the Court
declared that the defendant employer bears only the burden of clearly explaining the nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff, and defendant's evidentiary obligation is limited
to a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion.
45. MeDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. Id. at 256. This burden is concomitant with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
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3. Disparate Impact Cases
Disparate impact cases avoid the issue of discriminatory motive by focusing on
facially neutral employment practices that have an adverse impact on a protected
group and cannot be justified by job relatedness.46 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.47 the
Supreme Court held that employment criteria must bear a demonstrable relationship
to successful performance on the job for which they are used.48 The good faith of the
employer or lack of discriminatory intent does not rescue employment practices that
have a disproportionate impact on minorities.
Once the plaintiff in a discriminatory impact case makes a prima facie showing
of the adverse impact, the burden is on the defendant to produce evidence of job
relatedness, that is, a business necessity.4 9 The employee may also rebut the employ-
er's showing with proof that less discriminatory methods were available to achieve
the employer's goal.50
I. HiSHON V. KING & SPALDING
A. Facts
In 1972 Elizabeth Hishon graduated with honors from Columbia University
School of Law and was hired as an associate by King & Spalding. 5 1 King & Spald-
ing, a large law firm in Atlanta, Georgia, operates as a partnership that consists of
over 100 attorneys divided approximately equally between partners and associates.5 2
When Hishon joined the firn, she was the second female attorney employed by King
& Spalding. Although King & Spalding was formed in 1885, at the time the com-
plaint was filed King & Spalding had never admitted a woman to partnership. 53 King
persuading the court that he or she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Paxton v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 569 (8th Cir. 1982) (better qualifications used as a pretext for racially motivated discrimination);
Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975) (better qualifications used as pretext); Causey v. Ford Motor Co.,
516 F.2d 416, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting subjective decision by employer that others were better qualified);
Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 509 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 1975) (skills and experience demanded were not
actually necessary for the job).
46. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
48. Id. at 436. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The employer is not
restricted from attempting to reach a maximum level of efficiency. See, e.g., 110 CoNo. Rac. 7771 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Tower) ("The successful business is one with every job filled by the most competent man available."); Id. at
7218 (Senator Clark remarks that "[t]he employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes.") See generally Note,
Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
49. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1980).
50. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 649 F.2d
1084, 1098 (5th Cir. 1981); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965 (1981).
51. Petition for Cert. at 4, lishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
813 (1983).
52. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
53. Petition for Cert. at 4, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
813 (1983). King & Spalding did have a female partner by the time the district court decided the case. See Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 25 Empil. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703 at 20,064 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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& Spalding had employed a female attorney, however, from 1944 until 1977 as a
permanent associate.
54
Hishon alleged that she "was induced to accept employment by King & Spald-
ing because of the express promise and representation that she would be considered
for partnership on a fair, nondiscriminatory basis upon satisfactory completion of six
years of employment as an associate." 55 Hishon also alleged that "King & Spalding
discriminated against [Hishon] on the basis of sex and, in considering her promotion
to partnership, refused to utilize the same standards it applied to male associates who
were admitted to partnership. ,56 Hishon and two male associates were denied
partnership in May, 1978, while other male associates were asked to join.57 Eight
months later, Hishon requested reconsideration for partnership, but in May, 1979,
she was again rejected. 58 Hishon's employment subsequently was terminated because
King & Spalding maintains an "up or out" policy which allows the rejected associate
to remain with the firm only for such reasonable period necessary to secure other
employment. 59 Hishon filed a sex discrimination complaint in federal court after
receiving the EEOC right to sue notice.60
B. Proceedings Below
The district court imposed a stay on discovery of the merits, limiting the parties
to discovery on the threshold jurisdictional issue.6 1 The court was presented with the
novel question whether law firm partnership decisions are exempt from the prohibi-
tion of discrimination in Title VII. The plaintiff proposed three legal theories for the
application of Title VII: (1) partners at King & Spalding are equivalent to employees
of a corporation, thereby establishing the employment context for Title VII, (2)
elevation to partnership is an "employment opportunity" or a "term, condition, or
privilege of employment" protected by Title VII, and (3) termination of employment
resulting from the failure to make partner beause of sex discrimination is an unlawful
discharge prohibited by Title VII. 62 Plaintiff moved to compel discovery on these
issues, but the district court denied the motion63 and dismissed the complaint on the
ground that King & Spalding was outside the coverage of Title VII because it was
54. See Listings of King & Spalding in MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DiREcroRY (1944-1977); Sylvester, Is
Partnership Decision Subject to Bias Statute?, NAT'L L.J., February 7, 1983 at 6, col. 3.
55. Petition for Cert. at 4, Hishon v.King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (1Ilth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813
(1983).
56. Id.
57. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 n.2 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
58. Id. at 1024. The litigants disputed the nature of the May, 1979 meeting. King & Spalding argued that the
partnership voted not to reconsider Ms. Hishon for partnership and that the decision not to invite her was made in 1978.
Hishon claimed that the partnership reconsidered and revoted on the partnership issue at its 1979 meeting. The importance
of the date of rejection is that if the partnership decision was actually made in 1978, Hishon exceeded the 180 day filing
requirement for employment discrimination suits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). The Eleventh Circuit never reached
this issue because it found that Title VII did not apply. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
59. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
60. Id. at 1025. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
61. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1025 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
62. Id. at 1026.
63. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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organized as a partnership. 64 The district court compared a law firm partnership to a
marriage, concluding that the application of Title VII would resemble a statute for the
enforcement of shotgun weddings:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is, in fact, nothing
less than a 'business marriage' for better or worse. Just as in marriage different brides
bring different qualities into the union-some beauty, some money, and some character-
so also in professional partnerships, new mates or partners are sought and betrothed for
different reasons and to serve different needs of the partnership. Some new partners bring
legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring personality and negotiating skills. In
both, new mates are expected to bring not only ability and industry, but also moral
character, fidelity, trustworthiness, loyalty, personality and love. Unfortunately, how-
ever, in partnerships, as in matrimony, these needed, worthy and desirable qualities are
not necessarily divided evenly among the applicants according to race, age, sex or relig-
ion, and in some they just are not present at all. To use or apply Title VII to coerce a
mismatched or unwanted partnership too closely resembles a statute for the enforcement
of shotgun weddings. 6
5
In dismissing the complaint, the district court held that the associational rights of the
partnership precluded law firm partnership decisions from Title VII jurisdiction. 66
The district court felt confronted with a dilemma between construing Title VII to
cover partnership decisions, thereby establishing the subject matter jurisdiction for
Hishon's claim, and the possibility of impingement on the right of association were
Title VII found applicable to the process of selecting partners. The court resolved this
dilemma by holding that the right of the defendant to freedom of association seemed
clear, while the coverage of the Act seemed doubtful and obscure. 67 The court
acknowledged, however, that it was "humbly aware that in reaching this conclusion
it may have erred."-6
8
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiff urged that Title VII must be given
the broadest interpretation possible to effectuate its purpose-to remedy acts of
discrimination. 69 A majority of the court dismissed plaintiff's appeal and held that
Title VII did not apply:
Even under the most liberal reading we cannot find the requisite congressional intent to
permit Title VII's intervention into matters of voluntary association. We can conceive no
set of facts which would entitle her to relief under Title VII with respect to partnership
decisions. This renders dismissal of her claim proper.70
The majority decided that the essence of a partnership is voluntary association;
individuals are free to choose with whom they will associate in the practice of law
absent clear evidence of "the requisite congressional intent to permit Title VII's
64. Id. at 20,064.
65. Id. at 20,062.
66. Id. at 20,064.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). See
also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
70. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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intervention into matters. of [discrimination by] voluntary association[s]." '7 1 The
dissent, however, argued that Title VII applies to the defendant's partnership decision
if plaintiff's discharge from her position as an associate was a direct consequence of
an illegal, discriminatory decision by King & Spalding to refuse her admission to the
partnership.
72
IV. APPLYING TITLE VII TO PARTNERSHIP DECISIONS
The Hishon majority's position grants a blanket exemption from Title VII to all
economic organizations operating as partnerships. This exemption perpetuates con-
tinued employment discrimination in the legal profession's prestigious positions,
thereby removing a significant segment of the economy from Title VII's ju-
risdictional reach. 73 Deprived of Title VII protection, women, blacks, and other
minorities are susceptible to discriminatory practices when they seek advancement
from the entry level associate positions to the more lucrative opportunities available
only to partners.
This Comment will argue further that the majority's view of the jurisdictional
reach of Title VII is inconsistent with the intent of Congress. The Supreme Court has
held:
[I]n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all
practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin... and ordained that
its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the 'highest priority'....74
The Supreme Court, emphasizing that Congress did not intend to exempt the pro-
fessional occupations from its prohibition on discrimination, declared: "Congress
required the 'removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment' and professional development that had historically been encountered by
women, blacks, and other minorities." 75 The Supreme Court's interpretation of
71. Id. See Comment, Judicial Intervention in Admission Decisions of Private ProfessionalAssociations, 49 U. CH.
L. REv. 840, 842 (1982).
72. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (1 th Cir. 1982) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 813 (1983).
73. The Supreme Court has observed that "some of the most powerful private institutions in the Nation are conducted
in partnership form. Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms provide significant examples. These are often large,
impersonal, highly structured enterprises of essentially perpetual duration." Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1974). In 1972, there were 25,500 legal partnerships in the United States, grossing$5,91 1,000,000 in the $10,938,000,000
legal industry. By 1977, there were 29,200 partnerships, the legal profession was an 18.7 billion dollar industry, and
partnerships accounted for approximately $10,093,000,000 of the total amount. U.S. BUREAu OFTHE CENsUs, STAns'ncAL
ABsTRAcT OF THE UNtrrED STATES 185, Chart No. 311 (103d ed. 1982-83).
74. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,447 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971)). In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to include academic institutions within its coverage. During the
Congressional debate, Congress specifically considered and rejected a proposal to exempt physicians and surgeons from
Title VII jurisdiction. Senator Javits spoke in opposition to the proposed exemption, declaring:
[T]his amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injustice, and reinstate the possibility of
discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, color, sex, religion-just confined to physicians or surgeons, one of
the highest rungs of the ladder that any member ofa minority could attain-and thus lock in and fortify the idea that
being a doctor or a surgeon is just too good for members of a minority, and that they have to be subject to
discrimination in respect of it, and the Federal law will not protect them.
I18 CONG. REC. 3802 (1972) (statement ofSenatorJavits). It seems clear, therefore, that Congress never intended to exclude
the professional occupations from the coverage of Title VII.
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congressional intent was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Kamberos v. GTE Auto-
matic Electric, Inc.7 6 when it held that the defendant employer had violated Title VII
by refusing to hire the plaintiff for a corporate attorney position. The defendant's
refusal to hire was based solely on the applicant's gender; thus the court was able to
use Title VII to strike down discriminatory hiring practices in a professional employ-
ment context. 7 Indeed, even the judiciary has been subject to the jurisdictional reach
of Title VII. In Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County78 the federal district
court held that the county court engaged in sex discrimination when the presiding
judge of its juvenile court division transferred a female hearing officer to a less
prestigious staff attorney position. 79 The judge transferred the woman after observing
that "things aren't going to run smoothly around here until we get rid of these
goddamn women." °80 The federal court denied judicial immunity under anti-
discrimination legislation.
The Hishon majority rejected the Supreme Court's interpretation of the intended
jurisdictional reach of Title VII and placed on the plaintiff the burden of proving from
the legislative history that Congress specifically intended to cover partnership de-
cisions. Unable to clearly discern evidence of the "requisite congressional intent," 81
the majority presumed that Congress intended to insulate partnership decisions by law
firms and other matters of voluntary association from Title VII's prohibitions on
discrimination. The viewpoint of the majority inexplicably ignores the presumption
that Title VII comprehensively applies to all employment opportunities unless a
specific exemption exists. Courts often liberally construe remedial legislation for
jurisdictional purposes. The Supreme Court has declared that because Title VII was
"intended to be broadly inclusive ' 8 2 the lower federal courts "must therefore avoid
interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, with-
out clear congressional mandate."
83
In Hishon the EEOC supported the applicability of Title VII to a law firm's
decision to form a partnership. 84 The majority, however, was unconvinced by the
EEOC's support for the appellant's position. The Supreme Court has declared that
"[w]hen faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court [has shown] great
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration.'"85 Similarly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.8 6 the Supreme Court
76. 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 601. Other federal courts have held that Title VII applies to a law firm's hiring of associates. See Kohn v.
Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); Lucido
v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1,4
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
78, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
79. Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1375, 1379 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
80, Id.
81. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
82. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
83. Id. at 178.
84. The EEOC filed an amicus brief with the Eleventh Circuit supporting appellant's position. Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1025 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
85. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). See also Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 408 (7th
Cir. 1974).
86. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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held that the administrative interpretation of Title VII by the EEOC is entitled to great
deference.8 7 Congress created the EEOC as the administrative agency empowered to
effectuate the national policy against discrimination.8 8 The EEOC is responsible for
enforcing, interpreting, and administering Title VII; therefore, the principle that
courts should respect an agency's contemporaneous construction of a disputed provi-
sion of its enabling statute89 should have persuaded the majority to adopt the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII.90
A. Title VII and Law Firms
Discriminatory employment practices at the professional level have become
subject to increasing attack, and law firms have been no exception as litigants and
courts struggle to determine the scope of Title VII. 91 Although Title VII does not
contain any explicit exceptions for law firms, the Hishon majority created an excep-
tion despite the Supreme Court's admonition that "[w]here Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not
to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent."-
92
Other courts have refused to allow law firms to escape Title VII jurisdiction. In
EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella93 a federal district court declared that "since the primary
objective of Title VII is the elimination of major social ills of job discrimination,
discriminatory practices in professional fields are not immune from attack."-94 In
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore95 another federal district court confronted the
same issue as the Hishon court-the alleged discriminatory denial of partnership to a
87, Id. at 433-34.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976).
89. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
90. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1981); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449
U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
91. See generally Bardeen, The Legal Profession: A New Target for Title VII?, 55 CAt.. ST. B.J. 360 (1980);
Bartolet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947 (1982); Paone & Reis, Effective
Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 615 (1967); Stacey,
Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REv. 737 (1976); Waintroob, The Developing
Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45 (1979);
Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. Rv. 457 (1980); Note, Applicability of Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REv. 282 (1978); Note, Self Defense for
Women Lawyers: Enforcement of Employment Rights, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 517 (1971).
92. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980); See also Continental Casualty Co. v. United
States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942). Title VII does enumerate specific exemptions from the definition of employer. The
term employer does not include:
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or
any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service
(as defined in Section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor
organization) which is exempt from taxation under Section 501 (c) of Title 26, except that during the first year
after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be consid-
ered employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Although Congress could have exempted partnerships from Title VII jurisdiction, it refused
to do so. Further evidence of Congress' desire for Title VII to be all-inclusive was its specific rejection of a special
exemption for physicians. See supra note 75.
93. 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. I1. 1975).
94. Id. at 180. See also Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515,521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed,
496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
95. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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law firm associate. On the basic question of Title VII jurisdiction, the court con-
cluded that Congress had defined discrimination broadly to include the entire scope of
the working environment within the protective ambit of the Act.
9 6
A prerequisite to the applicability of Title VII is either that an employer-
employee relationship exist or the person has applied for employment. 97 The Title
VII definition of "employer" encompasses three requirements: (1) a person,98 (2)
engaged in an industry affecting commerce, 99 and (3) having fifteen or more
employees. 0 0 A law firm such as King & Spalding would be subject to the provisions
of Title VII because it meets the jurisdictional criteria of an employer. 101 Since Title
VII defines "employee" as an individual employed by an employer,102 an associate
in a law firn qualifies as an employee.103
Although the establishment of an employer-employee relationship is a juris-
dictional prerequisite to a Title VII employment discrimination suit, the plaintiff must
still address the issue whether Title VII applies to the decision of a law firm to deny
partnership status to an associate. Hishon alleged three bases for jurisdiction-
partners as employees, partnership as a term, condition or privilege of employment,
and discriminatory termination.1'4 The resolution of this jurisdictional issue requires
a delicate balancing between the interest of society in prohibiting discrimination,
particularly when that discrimination denies important social and economic benefits,
and the right of the law firm partnership to select its members without governmental
interference.
96. Id. at 126.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D.
La. 1975).
98. A "person," as defined by the statute, includes individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1978).
99. "Commerce" is defined broadly as trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication
between states, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1976), and "industry affecting commerce" includes any activity or business in
commerce in which a labordispute would hinder or obstruct commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1976). See EEOC v. Rinella
& Rinella. 401 F. Supp. 175, 182 (N.D. I11. 1975) (dynamics inherent in a general law practice necessarily involve the
practice in interstate commerce).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
101. King & Spalding consistently has ranked among the largest 200 law firms in the United States. In 1979 King &
Spalding ranked 97th, in 1980, 106th, in 1981, 98th, and in 1982, 115th. The Top 200 Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., September
13, 1982 at 14, 16, 18-19, September 20, 1982 at 13-16, October 6, 1980, at 32-37, October 13, 1980, at 34-38. King &
Spalding had more lawyers in 1980 (102) than the number of employees in 98% of all other businesses. U.S. DEP'T oF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BusrNEss PATrERNS-UNrrD STATES, Table 1B (1977). King & Spalding
has more lawyers than 9217 of the businesses in the United States that employ 15 or more people and therefore meets the
jurisdictional employee minimum. Id. Even if partners are left out of the total number of employees, King & Spalding is still
larger than 77% of the businesses covered by Title ViI. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976). See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896 (1972). This is the common federal statutory definition for "employee." Cf. H.R. REP. No. 914 pt. 1,88th Cong.,
1st Session 27 (1963).
103. In EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975) the law firm had attempted to argue that
associates of the firm were independent contractors, not employees. Had the law firm been able to establish that the
associates were not employees, it could have escaped Title VII applicability under the fifteen employee jurisdictional
requirement. The court rejected the law firm's argument by holding that associates were employees regardless of their
independence and that the professional fields of employment are not exempt from Title VII. id. at 179-80.
104. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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1. Owner or Employee?
Hishon argued that the size and complexity of King & Spalding resembled a
corporation rather than a true partnership and therefore its partners should be classi-
fied as employees and not owners.' 0 5 She alleged that the adoption of a written
partnership agreement expressly altered the firm's character from a traditional
common-law partnership to the skeletal structure of a corporation. 0 6 Hishon urged
that the partnership agreement gave King & Spalding the principal attributes of
incorporation, including (1) perpetual existence, (2) the "King & Spalding" trade
name, which does not represent the name of any of its living partners, (3) centralized
management and control by a committee that is the equivalent of a corporate board of
directors, and (4) a limitation on each partner's ownership interest in the assets of the
firm to the amount of his or her capital account.'0 7 The thrust of her argument was
that since the firm essentially functioned as a corporation, Title VII should apply
because a partnership decision is analogous to a promotion within the corporation.' 0 8
A partnership is "[a] voluntary contract between two or more competent persons
to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be proportional sharing
of the profits and losses between them."' 0 9 Under Georgia state law, "[a] partner-
ship may be created either by written or parol contract." ' 110 King & Spalding meets
these partnership definitions. Moreover, partnership theory' is not the only method
potentially available to prove that the partners functioned as employees.
11 2
For Title VII purposes, "Congress probably intended to treat the partnership as
an entity similar to a corporation rather than as an aggregate of the individual
partners." 113 Whether a partnership is to be regarded as an entity is governed by the
particular question before the court. 114 The entity theory describes the partnership as
separate and distinct from its individual members." 5 Hishon used this theory, alleg-
105. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
106. Id.
107. See Petition for Cert. at 5, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (1 lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
813 (1983).
108. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also 1 RowLEY ON PARTNERSHIP 35 (2d ed. 1960)
(partnership is "the relation existing between two or more individuals or associations of individuals, who have associated
themselves together for the purposes of sharing the profits and losses arising from a use of capital, labor or skill in some
common transaction or series of transactions"), See also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1914) (describing
partnership as ".... an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit").
110. GA. CODE ANN. § 75-1-1 (1981).
111. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 3 (1968). See also Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the
Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 377 (1963).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32 (discussing the economic realities test).
113. Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HAwv. L. REv. 457,462 (1980). See also J. CRANE & A.
BROMBERG, LAw OF PARTNERSHIP § 3 at 25 ("Ithere is no doubt of the ability of legislatures to treat partnerships as
entities . . . by defining operative words like 'person' . . . to include partnerships").
114. Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND L. REv. 377,
384 (1963).
115. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 113, at 17. The defendant, in its brief for the trial court, admitted that as a
partnership King & Spalding has an existence apart from its individual members. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,061 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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ing that King & Spalding's written partnership agreement, perpetual duration, cen-
tralized management, and limitations on a partner's share of the assets to his invested
capital were all attributes of a corporation rather than a true partnership.
116
The entity theory was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bellis v. United
States"7 when the Court declared that a partnership has "an established institutional
identity independent of its individual partners. '" 118 The Court thus prevented the
invocation of a fifth amendment privilege by the partner on behalf of the law firm
partnership by holding that the law partnership and a partner possessed individual
identities. The Court found factual support for the theory that the partnership was an
independent entity in the nature of the organization:
[T]he partnership represented a formal institutional arrangement organized for the con-
tinuing conduct of the finm's legal practice.... The firm maintained a bank account in
the partnership name, had stationary using the firm name on its letterhead, and, in
general, held itself out to third parties as an entity with an independent institutional
identity.119
King & Spalding undoubtedly engages in identical conduct, and the court's rationale
is therefore relevant to the question presented in Hishon.
A reasonable interpretation of Bellis is that the availability of constitutional or
statutory protections "should not turn on an insubstantial difference in the form of the
business enterprise.' 120 Similarly, a court should not shield a law firm from Title VII
jurisdiction by relying on the particular form of business organization that the law
firm utilizes. A significant trend among law firms is to organize as professional
corporations for tax purposes, 12' and every state has laws allowing professional
associations to conduct their business affairs as a corporation rather than as the more
traditional partnership.122 All employment decisions made by a professional corpora-
tion should be subject to Title VII because all the attorneys are employees of the
corporation, 123 and the particular business form an organization uses should be irrele-
vant to the jurisdictional application of Title VII.
Although the majority in Hishon recognized that large law partnerships possess
many attributes common to corporate forms of business, it refused to accept the
conclusion that a large, impersonal partnership should be treated on parity with
corporations for Title VII purposes.1 24 The economic realities test, however, may
allow the determination that a law firm partner is the equivalent of an employee
116. Petition for Cert. at 12, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813
(1983).
117. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
118. Id. at 95. See also Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661,663(5th Cir. 1968) (rejecting the theory that partnership
is an aggregate of self-employed individuals and applying the entity theory to hold that, for tax purposes, a partnership was
the "employer" of a 5% partner).
119. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1974).
120. The quoted languageisfromid.at 10-01. Seealso Note, Applicability ofFederalAntidiscriminationLegislation
to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 282, 290 (1978).
121. See generally Reimer, Professional Corporations: An Analysis, 62 MAss. L.Q. 151 (1977).
122. 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 5943.02, at 66,753-56 (1930). See also Note, Supra note 113, at 463.
123. 1 PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS GUmE (P-H) 3060 (1976).
124. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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without forcing the court to recognize the entity theory of partnership. The economic
realities test suggests that the term "employee" when used in social and labor
legislation should be interpreted according to the purpose of the legislation.' 25 If the
objectives of the Act prohibiting discriminatory practices are met by treating partners
as employees, and if the incidents of partnership are not inconsistent with that treat-
ment, Title VII should apply. 126 The Supreme Court has applied the economic real-
ities test to other federal legislation, reasoning that the term "employee" should be
construed in a comprehensive manner to accomplish the purpose of the legislation,
thereby rejecting attempts to narrow the scope of the legislation by use of con-
ventional limitations on the concept of the employer-employee relationship.' 2 7
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.128 the Court used the economic realities
test to hold that a newsboy was an employee of a newspaper for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act. The Court emphasized that:
[W]hen the economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than of
independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the
legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes
unrelated to the statute's objectives and bring the relation within its protections. Congress
recognized those economic relationships cannot be fitted neatly into the containers des-
ignated "employee" and "employer" which an earlier law had shaped for different
purposes .... 129
Recognizing the need for a flexible interpretation of the statutory language so that the
goals of the Act could be fulfilled, the Court also declared:
[T]he broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional limita-
tions on such conceptions as "employee," "employer," and "labor dispute," leaves no
doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underly-
ing economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal
classifications.13
0
In United States v. Silk' 3 ' the Court confirmed its adoption of the economic
realities test by holding that the terms "employment" and "employee" were to be
construed to further the policies underlying the applicable federal statute. The Court,
confronted with a problem of statutory interpretation regarding the applicability of the
Social Security Act to common law independent contractors, held:
As the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized evils in our national
economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport
with its purpose. Such an interpretation would only make for a continuance, to a consider-
125. 1 C. LAasoN, LAW OF WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION § 43.41 (1980).
126. Note, supra note 120, at 290. See also Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination
Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. Rav. 615, 633 (1967).
127. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961) (Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (Social Security Act); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (National
Labor Relations Act).
128. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. at 129 (footnotes omitted).
131. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
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able degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit
schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the ex-
pense of the benefits sought by the legislation.
32
Title VII similarly should be interpreted so that it can accomplish the purposes for
which it was enacted-elimination of employment discrimination. King & Spalding
argued that the court should not adopt the economic realities test to define the term
"employee" but rather should use the common dictionary meaning as suggested by
Senator Clark during Senate debate in reference to the term employer. 133 The dic-
tionary, however, provides a compound definition of employee: (1) "one employed
by another usually in a position below the executive level and usually for wages," or
(2) "any worker who is under wages or salary to an employer and who is not
excluded by agreement from consideration as such a worker."' 134 If the law firm
partner is assumed to be an executive, then arguably he is not an employee under the
first part of the definition. The second part of the definition, however, may operate to
include law firm partners if they draw a salary from the law firm employer. Partners
would not be considered employees only if the partnership agreement excluded them
from this classification.
The obvious problem with using this definition is that its inherent rigidity limits
a court's ability to apply it effectively to the varying circumstances provided by each
case. The term should have a flexible meaning so that it can be interpreted in a
manner that will further the aims of Title VII. Title VII's broad definition of em-
ployee as an "individual employed by an employer" 135 dictates that the applicability
of the Act should be determined by the economic facts. The facts in Hishon are that
King & Spalding operates under a trade name as a continuously existing enterprise
employing over 100 attorneys. 136 The partners resemble employees more than own-
ers of the business, and the statutory language should not be manipulated to obfuscate
the economic realities of the situation, thereby allowing law firms to avoid the
jurisdictional reach of Title VII.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that part ownership of a business does
not preclude one's classification as an employee for federal employment legislation
purposes. In Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.,13 1 the Court, con-
fronted with a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, emphasized that
"ownership" and "employee" status were not mutually exclusive:
There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a proprietary and an
employment relationship. If members of a trade union bought stock in their corporate
employer, they would not cease to be employees within the conception of the Act....
We fail to see why a member of a cooperative may not also be an employee of the
132. Id. at 712.
133. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 n.9 (1 th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
Senator Clark's remarks may be found at 110 CoNG. REc. 7216 (1964). Senator Clark did not endeavor, however, to
define "employee" according to its common dictionary meaning, nor did anyone else.
134. WEBsTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICnONARY 743 (1971).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976).
136. See supra note 101 and text accompanying note 107.
137. 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
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cooperative. In this case the members seem to us to be both "members" and "em-
ployees." It is the cooperative that is affording them the "opportunity to work, and
paying them for it . ,,t38
Although recognizing the substantial precedents advocating the adoption of the
economic realities test, the Hishon majority refused to accept the conclusion that the
economic reality of the relationship between a partner and a large law firm is one of
employment. The majority rejected the economic realities test as the sole inquiry in
favor of an analysis formulated by Judge Tjoflat in the Fifth Circuit case Calderon v.
Martin County. 139 The Hishon majority adopted the premise of the Fifth Circuit that
the status of "an employee under Title VII is a question of federal . . . law . . . to
be ascertained through consideration of the statutory language of the Act, its legisla-
tive history, existing federal case law, and the particular circumstances of the case at
hand."' 14° After finding little guidance in the statutory language and legislative his-
tory of Title VII, the Hishon majority turned to existing federal case law, including
analysis under the economic realities test and traditional agency and partnership
principles. 141
The Court's discussion of federal case law was limited to a brief analysis of one
case. The Court never adequately applied the economic realities test despite its claim
that this analysis was included in its examination of existing federal case law. To
support its decision that partners are not employees, the majority adopted the reason-
ing of Burke v. Friedman.142 Applying traditional partnership principles, the Seventh
Circuit held in Burke that the partners of an accounting firm were not employees for
the purposes of establishing the employee jurisdictional requirements of Title VII.
Although the jurisdictional issues were different in Hishon and Burke, 143 the majority
opinion had little trouble extrapolating the principle that partners are not employees
for Title VII purposes.
138. Id. at 32. See also Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 142-43 (6th Cir. 1977). When construing the
term "employee" under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the court rejected traditional common law concepts and held that
guidance for defining the term was provided by decisions interpreting the term as used in the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 301 to 1397f (1976), the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 187 (1976), and Title VII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976). The court went on to declare that the Act's definitions of its terms have been
construed liberally to effectuate the broad policies and intentions of Congress. Id. at 144.
139. 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1981).
140. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 (quoting Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271,272-73
(5th Cir. 1981)), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). The Calderon case dealt with the classification of "employee" for
purposes of establishing whether the plaintiff was a qualified litigant under Title VII. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678
F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 10 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). Although the Hishon majority admitted that
the question it faced was whether the partners could be consideredemployees and not whether Ms. Hishon was an
employee, the majority nevertheless found that the jurisdictional nature of the inquiry made the Calderon test appropriate.
The validity of the Calderon test is suspect, however, because there is no dispute that Hishon qualified as an employee
under Title VII. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03. The use of this test in Hishon also is ironic because the
Calderon test was formulated by J. Tjoflat, who dissented in Hishon and urged the court to adopt the economic realities
test.
141. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 (1 th Cir. 1982) (citing Donovon v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141
(5th Cir. 1981)); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977)), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
142. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
143. King & Spalding clearly meets the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII, whether or not the partners are
considered employees. See supra text accompanying note 101. Holding that partners are the equivalent of employees so that
they could then be counted in the determination whether a firm has the requisite number of employees for statutory
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The final component of the Calderon test requires an examination of the particu-
lar circumstances of the case. It is here that the Court should have applied the
economic realities test, recognizing that the facts of this case mandated a statutory
construction that would further the national policy of nondiscrimination. The Fifth
Circuit has urged that "Title VII's definition of 'employee' is not restrictive, [and
that] the existence of such a status for a certain individual must turn on the facts of
each case.""la Despite this view, the Hishon majority narrowly interpreted the term
"employee" and held that because King & Spalding operated as a true partnership,
the partners could not be employees. The firm files taxes as a partnership and has a
lengthy partnership agreement outlining procedures for profit and loss distribution,
withdrawal, dissolution, and other matters. The majority, relying on this evidence,
held that the law firm was a voluntary association of lawyers for the purpose of
practicing law as joint venturers.1 45
The majority's narrow interpretation of the term "employee" as used in Title
VII violates the principles of statutory construction that the federal courts have
followed when analyzing federal employment legislation. In Cannon v. University of
Chicago146 the Supreme Court found an implied private remedy available under Title
IX. The Court rejected the lower court's strict construction of the remedial aspect of
the statute because in its evaluation of the legislative history the lower court had
neglected to take account of the contemporary legal context within which the Act was
passed. 147 The Court then declared that "it is not only appropriate but also realistic to
presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [any] unusually important prec-
edents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be
interpreted in conformity with them.' 148 The Hishon majority similarly mis-
interpreted the legislative history because it failed to attribute sufficient importance to
the Supreme Court decision that had applied the economic realities test when defining
the term "employee" in federal legislation prior to the enactment of Title VII. 1
49
Undoubtedly, Congress was aware that there were three Supreme Court cases decided
prior to the enactment of Title VII that adopted fluid definitions of the term "employ-
ee" so that the underlying purposes of the statute could be attained. The presumption,
therefore, arises that Congress intended to adopt the Court's construction of the term.
Arguably, Congress' use of the identical term ("employee") in Title VII, without
debate over its intended meaning, signifies congressional acceptance of the Supreme
Court's fluid interpretation of the term. Congress undoubtedly was familiar with the
common-law definition of an employment relationship that included factors such as
jurisdictional limits would rzsult in an expansion of Title V's jurisdictional reach to cover smaller organizations that may
not presently be covered. In light of the strong national policy against discrimination, however, the courts should not be
reluctant to broaden the inclusive effect of the legislation. This policy is countered only by the consideration that the
smaller a partnership, the more that Title VII applicability will resemble a "shotgun wedding."
144. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972)).
145. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cit. 1982), cert. graned, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
146. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
147. Id. at 698-99.
148. Id. at 699.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 128-38.
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control exercised by employer over employee (including time, place, and duration of
employee's work and amount of payment), and the employer's discharge powers.
Title VII's definitions, however, require a more liberal definition of employee than
the traditional common-law analysis. 150 Although a law firm partner may not be a
common-law employee, good statutory construction and the social and economic
reality of the lawyer's status should determine the application of federal anti-
discrimination legislation.' 51
Furthermore, the broad, inclusive language of Title VII is similar to other social
and labor statutes passed by Congress and interpreted by the courts. Courts have held
that "[u]se of the same language in various enactments dealing with the same general
subject matter [in this case, employment], is a strong indication that the statutes
should be interpreted to mean the same thing." 52 The remedial nature of Title VII
should pose no obstructions to an interpretation of its terms that parallels that given to
identical terms in other federal employment legislation. The terms "employee" and
"employment" consistently have been given an expansive construction designed to
eliminate the evils Congress sought to remedy by passing the legislation.
The dissent in Hishon urged the court to examine the reality of the events alleged
by the plaintiff and not to be concerned with the "conventional garb in which those
events are cloaked." 1 53 The economic reality of the relationship between a partner
and a large institutional law firm essentially is one of employment. A partner does not
participate in the profits as a return on invested capital but rather is compensated
based upon his total earnings derived from his labor. By weighing the important
purpose of Title VII and avoiding a narrow common law concept of partnership that
prefers form over function, the Hishon majority logically should have reached the
conclusion that partners of law firms are employees for Title VII purposes.
The narrow view of "employee" adopted by the Hishon majority already has
been specifically rejected by the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Association. 154 The court was confronted with the issue whether people acting
concurrently as members of the Board of Directors and officers of a benevolent
association should be considered employees under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA). 155 The district court held that the directors/officers were not
employees protected by the ADEA because they assumed office by an elective pro-
150. See Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Laiyers,
40 S. CAL. L. REv. 615, 634 (1967).
151. Id. at 639.
152. Hargrave v. OKI Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412
U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
153. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (11th Cir. 1982) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 813 (1983).
154. 694 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982).
155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). The proscription of discrimination found in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act traces Title VII's language, except that age is substituted for the impermissible
classification. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 25. Additionally, the Act's definition of employee as "an individual employed by an employer," 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(f) (1976), and employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976), are
identical to Title VII's definitions. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
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cess and because directorships have traditionally been viewed as employer rather than
employee positions.' 56 The district court argued by analogy to Hishon and empha-
sized that an election to the Board of Directors, like an election to the partnership of a
law firm, involves an internal decision on who should govern and set broad policies
for the organization. 1
57
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court interpreted the term
"employee" too narrowly. 158 The court declared that when interpreting the term
"employee" in social welfare legislation, courts have used a broad definition so as to
effectuate the stated purposes of the statutes. 159 The court rejected the analogy to
Hishon that the defendant espoused, and declared that a determination whether an
individual is an employee and therefore covered by the federal antidiscrimination
legislation should not center on the label which the organization has chosen to give
the position. 160 The court examined the true status of the individuals and found that
they performed traditional employee duties and drew salaries as employees. The
court held that election to the Board of Directors did not preclude these individuals
from being classified as employees for the purposes of the Act. Similarly, the Hishon
court should have examined the true nature of the jobs performed by the partners at
King & Spalding. Although the partners are theoretically responsible for directing the
firm, a hierarchical structure exists that delegates authority to various committees
responsible for the overall operation of the firm. An individual partner's participation
is obviously limited by the size of the firm and the scope of the operations. The
partner's working day is predominantly occupied with traditional employee duties. If
the court had accepted these facts and applied a liberal construction to the terms of
Title VII so as to effectuate the stated national policy prohibiting discrimination, the
court logically would have reached the conclusion that law firm partners can be
considered employees for Title VII purposes.
2. Partnership as a Term, Condition or Privilege of Employment
Hishon alleged that King & Spalding expressly promised she would be consid-
ered for promotion to partnership on a nondiscriminatory basis after six years and an
invitation to join the partnership would be extended to her in return for satisfactory
work as an associate, 16 1 and that this promise was a "term, condition or privilege of
employment" 162 or an "employment opportunity" 163 protected under Title VII.
164
Under this theory, the court need not equate partners with employees to bring law
156. EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1069 (6th Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 1070.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court's examples of social welfare legislation were the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VI, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.
160. Id.
161. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
164. See supra text accompanying note 25. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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firm partnership decisions within Title VII's jurisdictional reach. Even if partners are
not employees, the transitional stage between an associate, who clearly retains em-
ployee status, and a partner would still be subject to Title VII's nondiscrimination
requirements.
The "term, condition or privilege" language has been held to prohibit dis-
crimination in considering employees for promotion.165 The fundamental inquiry,
therefore, is whether an advancement to partnership status is the equivalent of a
promotion. The partnership offer is similar to promotion because it is offered as an
inducement to join the firm and as a reward for demonstrable efficiency and effective-
ness during the period in which one is an associate. 166
Substantial precedent supports the proposition that a right of an employee to be
considered for promotion on a nondiscriminatory basis is covered by federal employ-
ment legislation whether or not the employee would be covered after the pro-
motion. 167 Thus, even assuming that Title VII may not apply to partners within law
firms, the protection it affords employees would remain unaffected in the process of
partner selection. In NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp.168 an individual was denied a
promotion to the position of foreman because of discrimination by the employer.
Although the position of employee was covered by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the position of foreman did not fall under the auspices of the Act. 169 The
Second Circuit nevertheless found discrimination under the NLRA, holding that:
[a]t the time the discrimination took place he [plaintiff] was clearly a protected employee,
and his prospects for promotion were among the conditions of employment. The Act
protected him so long as he held a nonsupervisory position, and it is immaterial that the
protection thereby afforded was calculated to enable him to obtain a position in which he
would no longer be protected.1
70
In Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRB 17 ' an employee was scheduled for
promotion when his employer engaged in an unfair labor practice resulting in a
wrongful discharge. The employer argued that back pay stemming from the wrongful
discharge should terminate on the date the employee was to have been promoted
because the new position was excluded from the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the defendant, stating:
It is undisputed that when [the employee] was discriminatorily discharged he was an
ordinary employee. The Act's remedies are not thwarted by the fact that an employee who
165. See, e.g., United Transp. Union Local No. 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 532 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 440-42 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
166. See White, Women in the Law, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 1051, 1106 n.91 (1967); Note, Self Defense for Women
Lawyers: Enforcement of Employment Rights, 4 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 517, 531 (1971).
167. Golden State Bottling Co., Inc., v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 188 (1973); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d
235, 237 (2d Cir. 1953); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
169. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (definition ofemployee does not include foremen
or other supervisory personnel).
170. NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1953).
171. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
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is within the Act's protections when the discrimination occurs would have been promoted
or transferred to a position not covered by the Act if he had not been discriminated
against.' 72
These cases demonstrate that federal employment legislation applies to an employ-
ment situation in which an employee is promoted to a position that is not covered by
the statute. The rationale underlying the NLRA's exclusion of managerial personnel
from the Act's provisions is that once a person becomes part of management, his or
her susceptibility to unfair labor practices is diminished. The same rationale can be
extended to Title VII if it is assumed that partners are excluded from coverage of the
Act. Once the lawyer achieves partnership status, it is assumed that any dis-
criminatory practices that may occur will not substantially impede his or her pro-
fessional status or livelihood. Under both acts, however, the transition or promotional
process from a "covered" employment status to a potentially "excluded" employ-
ment status is a protected occurrence.
Unlike the NLRA, however, Title VII jurisdiction extends to managerial and
supervisory personnel, thereby encompassing at least some of the functions per-
formed by law firm partners. The coverage under Title VII, therefore, is significantly
broader than under the NLRA, making the argument for coverage even stronger. A
discriminatory denial of partnership should be subject to Title VII because the associ-
ate is clearly within the protective ambit of the Act. The applicability of the Act to the
partners themselves is irrelevant because it is the transitional phase between associate
and partner that is subject to Title VII scrutiny.
A law firm should not escape Title VII jurisdiction because of the partial owner-
ship by the partners of the organization. Partial ownership has never been a jur-
isdictional defense to federal antidiscrimination legislation. In Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. 173 a group of black employees brought suit alleging denial of
promotional opportunities to the Board of Operatives of the company. The Board of
Operatives was composed of nonsupervisory personnel elected by the employees to
advise company management on matters affecting the welfare of the employees and
to serve as a conduit for communication between management and employees. The
Board of Operatives, in conjunction with a management board, controlled all the
outstanding stock of the company as trustees for the employees. The court found that
by virtue of this ownership interest, election to the Board of Operatives was a
valuable term, condition or privilege of employment within the express coverage of
Title VII, and the court thus ordered the discrimination terminated. 174
Similarly, in Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,175 the company followed a
shareholder preference plan that restricted ownership of company shares to members
of the immediate families of the founders of the company. An employee could not
buy shares without the approval of all the other shareholders, and the Board of
172. Id. at 188.
173. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974).
174. Id. at 265.
175. 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Directors maintained custody and possession of all shares and assumed title upon the
death of the shareholder. 176 Defending a suit alleging discrimination against minority
nonshareholder employees, the company argued that Title VII had no application to
discrimination in the sale of corporate stock. 17 7 The Ninth Circuit rejected this con-
tention, stating: "Since the company ties preferential wages, hours, and job assign-
ments to ownership of its stock, a shareholder preference plan constitutes a condition
of employment subject to the mandate of Title VII."17 The court noted further that
although the company's organization "closely entangles stock ownership and em-
ployment privilege, .... the predominant characteristics are those of employ-
ment." 
17 9
A decision more closely analogous to Hishon is Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore,180 in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging
unlawful discharge of an associate. The plaintiff argued that the law firm engaged in
discriminatory practices by preventing, in violation of Title VII, his promotion to
partner. The court held that under the facts of the case, the opportunity to become a
partner in the law firm was a term, condition or privilege of employment and an
employment opportunity within the meaning of Title VII.18 1 A clear employer-
employee relationship existed between the plaintiff and the law firm, and discrimina-
tion in a promotional opportunity during that relationship was thus covered by Title
VII.182 The court bypassed the issue whether partners in law firms are within the
jurisdiction of Title VII by declaring that the opportunity to be promoted to a position
not itself covered by Title VII does not mean that discrimination in that promotion
cannot be prohibited under Title VH. 18 3
The argument that promotion to partnership is a privilege of employment has
received substantial support from the commentators:
[To say that the prospect of becoming a partner is not one of the attributes or "priv-
ileges" of employment with a law firm is to ignore reality .... [T]he prospect
of... partnership and the added compensation which it is expected to bring can offset
other detriments of the job, such as comparatively low beginning pay or undesirable
working conditions. Thus, . . . the opportunity to compete for a partnership position [is]
one of the "privileges" of employment of which the act speaks.184
The offer of partnership status is a privilege sought by associates throughout their
apprenticeship period.' 85 The additional compensation concomitant with significant
job security surely establishes the inherent privilege to be gained by partnership in a
176. Id. at 1300.
177. Id. at 1302.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Lucido argued that Cravath had impermissibly discriminated against him
based on national origin and religion.
181. Id. at 127.
182. Id. at 128.
183. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
184. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051, 1106 (1967); Note, Self Defense for Women Lanyers:
Enforcement of Employment Rights, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 517, 531 (1971).
185. See Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1980).
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law firm. To deny this privilege of employment on the basis of sex is to discriminate
in a manner that is prohibited by the Act.
The literal language of the statute assumes special significance if a law firm
maintains an up or out policy. By hinging continued employment with the firm on an
associate's acceptance to partnership, the firm explicitly establishes partnership as a
condition of employment. 186 The employment of an associate with the firm is con-
ditional and remains that way until the partnership decision is made. It is only with a
partnership offering that an employee's vulnerability is largely eliminated and job
security is more or less assured.
The majority opinion in Hishon recognized the premise that an "opportunity"
can include promotion to a position beyond that of an employee covered by Title VII.
The majority refused, however, to extend the meaning of "employment opportuni-
ties" to encroach upon the decision of individuals to voluntarily associate in a
business partnership.187 The majority distinguished the cases relied upon by Hishon,
stating that their holdings should be narrowly construed according to the individual
fact pattern of each case. The majority disposed of Lucido by respectfully disagreeing
with the decision of the court and observing that the discussion of discrimination in
partnership promotion was merely dicta.' 8 8
3. Up or Out?
The final argument by Hishon for applying Title VII to law firm partnership
decisions was that she had been denied employment opportunities as a result of the
firm's implementation of its up or out policy. Hishon alleged that denial of partner-
ship adversely affected her employment status by resulting in her termination. 189
Hishon's termination was the factor that motivated the dissent's declaration that Title
VII should apply to this situation; Judge Tjoflat urged that "when the partnership
decision inextricably and inevitably is a decision whether to terminate employment, I
would hold that Title VII applies."' 190 The harsh consequences of denying partner-
ship to an associate mandates that a Title VII analysis is appropriate when that
associate alleges discriminatory treatment.
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore'9 1 is analogous to Hishon in that in each
case the defendant maintained an up or out policy.192 The Lucido court held that
"[t]he Cravath policy ... makes the opportunity to be promoted to partner 'a term,
186. See Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lanyers,
40 S. CAL. L. REv. 615, 640 (1967).
187. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (l1th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
188. Id. at 1029.
189. Termination of employment that adversely affects the status of an employee is subject to Title VII restrictions.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson v.
General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1978); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975);
Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
190. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1030 (1lth Cit. 1982) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
191. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
192. Id.
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condition, or privilege of employment' . . . within the meaning of... Title
VII." 193 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the analysis of the Lucido court, characteriz-
ing the termination argument by Hishon as an attempt to establish Title VII jurisdic-
tion "through the back door." 194 Although the majority cited Lucido for the proposi-
tion that discriminatory termination alone may be a cause of action for unlawful
discharge under Title VII, the majority went on to declare that "when the termination
is a result of the partnership decision, it loses its separate identity and must fall prey
to the same ill-fate as [the] original attempt [by the plaintiff] to apply Title VII to
partnership decisions. "195 Despite the harsh consequences of a law firm's up or out
policy, the resulting discharge provides the weakest grounds for extension of Title
VII to partnership decisions. If the discharge is solely the result of the partnership
decision, then Hishon must prove that the partnership decision itself, rather than its
effect, was discriminatory since the Supreme Court has held that the present effect of
a past act of discrimination is not actionable. 196 In Delaware State College v. Ricks 1
9 7
the plaintiff alleged that discrimination motivated the College not only in denying
him tenure, but also in terminating his employment after his one-year contract exten-
sion had expired.198 The Court held that the only alleged discrimination occurred at
the time the tenure decision was made, even though the effects of the denial of
tenure-the eventual loss of a teaching position-did not occur until later. 199 For
Hishon to maintain a claim of discriminatory discharge, therefore, she would have to
allege and prove that the manner in which her employment was terminated differed
discriminatorily from the manner in which the law firm terminated other associates
who also had been denied partnership status.
B. Problems in Application-Judicial Hesitation
The majority opinion in Hishon reflects the attitudes of some courts that are
hesitant to apply Title VII to law firms or other upper level positions.200 Four themes
dominate the arguments of those opposed to the application of Title VII to law firm
partnership decisions-the sensitive nature of law firm discovery, the constitutionally
based right of association, the effect of state laws governing business entities, and the
inherent difficulty of judicial analysis of subjective selection criteria for promotion.
Although courts have found these issues problematic in Title VII litigation, they are
insufficient, either individually or in the aggregate, to limit the jurisdictional reach of
Title VII in professional level employment discrimination cases.
193. Id.
194. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1933).
195. Id.
196. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
197. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
198. Id. at 257.
199. Id. at 258.
200. The term "upper level position" refers to a socio-economic status achieved by some members of our society
through the particular occupation they pursue. Included in this group are most white collar employees, as well as
professionals such as doctors and lawyers. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv.
947, 948 (1982).
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1. Discovery
When preparing for litigation, any information within the knowledge of a party
or under that party's control 20 ' that is relevant to legal issues or likely to lead to
relevant information is discoverable.2 0 2 If a Title VII action is brought against a law
firm for discriminatory denial of partnership, courts must define the limits of the
discovery to be allowed. 20 3 Broad discovery of the law firm's operation may impinge
upon individual privacy, 20 4 and may lead to forced settlement of claims by a de-
fendant unwilling to risk having its internal affairs subject to public review. 20 5 To
proceed with a legitimate complaint, however, a plaintiff must have access to some of
the records of the law firm.20 6 The court must balance these competing interests so
that frivolous suits are discouraged and legitimate complaints are allowed to proceed.
The Hishon majority recognized the sensitivity of the discovery issue when
plaintiff sought to obtain the partnership agreement of King & Spalding. The district
court imposed a stay on discovery of the merits of the case and restricted initial
discovery to information needed for the threshold jurisdictional issue. 20 7 The court
granted the request by King & Spalding to supply an edited version of its agreement
as well as an edited version of its answers and objections to numerous interrogatories.
The court then placed all of the information under seal to avoid unnecessary dis-
closure.2 °8 The request by the plaintiff for additional discovery was objected to by
King & Spalding and denied by the court.
20 9
201. United States v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 519, 522 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
202. Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287, 295 (D. Del. 1975) (information with possible
relevance is discoverable). See generally B. ScHim & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1135-1146
(1976). FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(1) allows discovery of material that is relevant and admissible at trial, but also of
information that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
203. The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether to compel discovery. See FFD. R. Civ. P. 26,
33; Blum v. Gulf Oil Co., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir.
1977); Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1973).
204. See, e.g., Baer v. Standard Oil Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 657, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant
employer not required to answer interrogatories that may infringe employees' constitutional rights of privacy and free
exercise of religion).
205. Note, supra note 120, at 303 n.123.
206. The leading case allowing broad discovery is Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).
The appellate court analogized a private plaintiff's suit to the broad discovery powers of the EEOC, since extreme
prejudice may result if the plaintiff is denied access to necessary information. Id. at 305.
207. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1025 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). In
proceedings before the district court, Hishon had sought to inquire into such matters as the amount of capital contribution
required of the defendant's new partners, the amount of the firm's surplus and the interest of the various partners therein,
the division of the partnership points among each class of partners, and the amount of income derived therefrom by each.
See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The court declared
that this material would make interesting reading for King & Spalding's competitors and that the information sought
would make no difference in the case's outcome. Thus, the information was concluded to be of no concern to plaintiff. Id.
208. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The EEOC
participated as amicus curiae in the district court and submitted an amicus brief supporting the plaintiff's position. The
EEOC requested access to all discovery, but the court denied the request. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022,
1025 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983). Other courts have demonstrated similar concern over
public disclosure of discovered documents. In Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1979) the court ordered the plaintiff to produce its current membership list (plaintiff was an association of women law
students), but defendant's counsel could not communicate the answers to anyone other than the two named partners in the
firm who were handling the case. The court held that this ruling struck a sensible balance between the law firm's need to
defend the suit and the plaintiff's desire to avoid the purportedly adverse consequences of revealing information with
respect to its membership. Id. at 714. An analysis of when protective orders should be issued is presented in Koster v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
209. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1 th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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Discovery for a Title VII action brought by a plaintiff against a law firm can
include internal firm memoranda, depositions of partners and associates, and various
statistical information concerning the partnership and hiring practices of the firm. 2 10
In Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell,211 a discriminatory hiring practices action, the
court ordered the law firm to answer interrogatories concerning its practices regarding
the advancement of associates to partnership status. The interrogatories required the
firm to identify all female associates, state the average length of service with the firm
of all associates who were offered partnerships in the firm, and indicate any reasons
why partnership had not been offered within the average length of service.212 The
firm also had to identify female attorneys who were offered an opportunity to become
partners, state the dates on which they started working and the dates on which they
received partnership offers, and indicate their areas of specialization. 2 13 The court
decided that any general information on the labor hierarchy of defendant might be
reflective of restrictive or exclusionary hiring practices within the contemplation of
the statute. 2 14 The test formulated by the court is "whether the information requested
is so unrelated to plaintiffs' claim that women are discriminated against by defendant
on account of sex that it cannot be said to be 'relevant' within the expansive meaning
of that term in Rule 26. ,215
In Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore21 6 the court was confronted with sensi-
tive discovery issues concerning confidential documents relating to the law firm. The
law firm submitted interrogatories to the plaintiff requesting information regarding
oral statements upon which he had relied to support the allegations of his com-
plaint. 2 17 Upon receipt of Lucido's answers, which covered eighty-six oral state-
ments and were 104 pages in length, Cravath moved for a protective order pursuant to
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to put the answers under seal.218
Cravath had initially moved to put all the interrogatory answers under court seal, but
submitted instead a revised order to the court covering approximately one-half of the
oral statements enumerated in plaintiff's answers. 2 19 The court agreed that some
protection was necessary because the statements included charges of ethnic bigotry,
210. Note, supra note 120, at 303 n.123.
211. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
212. Id. at 87 n.1. See also Bardeen, The Legal Profession: A New Target for Title VII?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 360, 361
(1980).
213. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 87 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
214. Id. at 88 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) and Kohn v. Royall, Koegel
& Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1974)).
215. Id. See also supra note 202.
216. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
217. Id. See also Bardeen, The Legal Profession: A New Target for Title VII?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 360, 361 (1980).
218. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) provides
in pertinent part:
Upon motion by a party ... , and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending... may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: ... (5) that discovery be conducted with
no one present except persons designated by the court; ... (7) that... confidential ... commercial informa-
tion not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelope to be opened as directed by the court.
219. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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lack of intelligence, laziness, and unethical practices, thereby impugning the pro-
fessional qualifications, personal values, and character of attorneys in the firm.220
Although none of the information was confidential business information, significant
potential injury to personal and professional reputations warranted the issuance of a
protective order.
221
Courts have proceeded cautiously when confronted with requests for discovery
of sensitive law firm documents. The concern of the courts for the privacy of the
parties should be tempered, however, in light of the fact that documents of a law firm
may not be any more sensitive than other business documents that have been ex-
tracted from Title VII litigants. The courts must balance carefully the need of a
business entity to maintain confidentiality against the interests of the plaintiff in
proceeding with a legitimate Title VII claim. The courts in the Lucido and Blank
cases were not completely convinced that law firmn documents required complete
secrecy. These courts protected the privacy of the firm while allowing plaintiffs
sufficient access to the information necessary to prepare their case. The Hishon court
should have been more liberal in its weighing of the requests of plaintiff and the
objections of defendant to discovery. Hishon undoubtedly was hindered by the nar-
row scope of discovery imposed by the court and was thus denied the opportunity to
optimally prepare her case.222
2. Right of Association
The most frequent argument raised against applying Title VII to law finm
partnership decisions is that judicial interference in selection of a partner would
impermissibly impinge upon the constitutional rights of privacy and freedom of
association." The majority opinion in Hishon endorsed this theory when it stated
that Title VII should not encroach upon decisions of individuals to associate volun-
tarily in a business partnership.224 The right of association argument is supported by
the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg in Bell v. Maryland,223 concerning dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation:
Indeed, the constitutional protection extended to privacy and private association assures
against the imposition of social equality .... Prejudice and bigotry in any form are
regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to
any person or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the basis of
personal prejudices including race. 2 26
The district court in Hishon further observed that although many organizations have
220. Id.
221. Id. at 127.
222. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947, 962 (1982).
223. See Defendant's Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 15-19, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703 (N.D.
Ga. 1980). See also Note, supra note 113, at 468.
224. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
225. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
226. Id. at 313 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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abolished their discriminatory practices, they have done so voluntarily and not be-
cause of any recognition that the law requires it.
227
Although the district court in Hishon based its rejection of Title VII jurisdiction
primarily on a freedom of association theory, the court was able to find minimal
precedential support for this right in a business or commercial partnership context.
The district court relied on the majority opinion by Justice Harlan in NAACP v.
Alabama,228 which, after recognizing the right of association, stated that "it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to polit-
ical, economic, religious or cultural matters .... [S]tate action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." 229
The district court then analogized a professional partnership to the marriage
institution, the central unifying characteristic being the freedom to select a mate who
will bring the most ideal qualities into the relationship. 230 The court concluded this
analogy by urging that applying Title VII to coerce a mismatched or unwanted
partnership too closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shotgun
weddings.2 31 Using this marriage analogy, the district court found support for its
freedom of association notion in Griswold v. Connecticut:
232
This law [relating to contraceptives], however, operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation. ...
In NAACP v. Alabama we protected the "freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations," noting that freedom of association was a peripheral First Amendment
right .... The right of "association" like the right of belief is more than the right to
attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means.
233
The fundamental principle underlying the freedom of association is that although
discrimination in the selection of social partners or associates may be regarded by
some to be deplorable, society cannot impose business or social relationships on
individuals.23 4
227. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
228. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
229. Id. at 460-61.
230. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also supra
text accompanying note 65. The marriage analogy was not the only one conceived by the court. The court also argued that
an election to partnership in a law firm was comparable to a "promising young engineer working for the Chevrolet
Division of General Motors who is elected to the board of directors of that corporation." Id. at 20,064. The court believed
that because Title VII does not apply to the election of corporate directors, it should not apply to partnership promotions.
Nevertheless, the promotion process of General Motors for the career path of the engineer would be within the ambit of
Title VII protection, and therefore, the associate in a law firm should be entitled to equivalent safeguards. The comparison
between an associate in a law firmn making partner and an engineer becoming a director in one of the largest corporations in
the world is not one that can be logically made; and thus, the analogy is of negligible value in determining Title VII
application.
231. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dee. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,062 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
232. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
233. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,062-63 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965)).
234. Note, supra note 120, at 317. See generally Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A
Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. REv. 473, 530 (1971); Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A
Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. R-v. 59, 63 (1967).
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In Hishon the majority extended the right of association beyond its traditional
application by holding that partners in a law firm possess a cognizable legal right of
association that transcends the prohibitions of Title VII. The freedom to associate is a
first amendment right recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama.235 It
allows an individual "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas .... ,, 6 The Court has deemed it necessary to protect this right because "it
promotes and may well be essential to the '[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones' that the First Amendment is
designed to foster." 2 37 The most analogous case to a law firm's associational rights is
NAACP v. Button,23 8 in which the NAACP sued to enjoin enforcement of a Virginia
statute that regulated the legal profession. The NAACP was engaged in solicitation of
legal business to fulfill its primary purpose of eliminating racial discrimination. The
NAACP claimed that the state law prohibiting solicitation by attorneys infringed the
right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of
assisting persons who seek legal redress. 239 The Court held that the NAACP as a
corporation could assert the rights on its own behalf, and that the activities of the
NAACP and its legal staff are modes of expression and association protected by the
first and fourteenth amendment which the state could not prohibit.24 Influenced by
the purpose of the NAACP's solicitation, the Court allowed the organization to assert
these rights. The Court held:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all
government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this
country. It is thus a form of political expression. 241
Thus, it is significant that the Court's acceptance of the lawyer's freedom of associa-
tion was attributable to the organization's efforts to overcome discrimination.
The freedom of association, however, was never intended to be used to over-
come antidiscrimination legislation. In Runyon v. McCrary242 black parents brought
section 1981 actions against private schools in Virginia after their children had been
denied admission because the schools were not integrated.2 4 3 The Court held that the
racial discrimination practiced by the schools violated section 19812" The Court
then proceeded to analyze whether the application of section 1981 would violate the
235. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
236. Id. at 460.
237. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). In
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), the Court was faced with deciding the constitutionality of parts of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. The Court declared that the freedom of association included the "freedom to associate
with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas." Id. at 15 (citing Kasper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,
56 (1973)).
238. 371 U.S. 415 (1962).
239. Id. at 428.
240. Id. at 428-29.
241. Id. at 429.
242. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ......
244. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976).
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constitutionally protected rights of association and privacy. Acknowledging that there
is a first amendment right encompassing a freedom of association, the Court assumed
that parents have a right to send their children to educational institutions that promote
the belief that racial segregation is desirable.24 The Court went on to observe,
however, that "it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from
such institutions is also protected by the same principle. 246 The Supreme Court has
emphasized that "'the Constitution... places no value on discrimination' . . . and
although '[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of ex-
ercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. . .it has never
been accorded affirmative constitutional protection." 247 The freedom to associate is
solely a derivative of other constitutional rights; no express constitutional language
guarantees its existence. Allowing partners in law firms to discriminate in a manner
theoretically legitimated by a right of association thus ignores the admonition of the
Supreme Court that the eradication of discrimination takes precedence over a tangen-
tial right that is without concrete constitutional foundation.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view toward extending the
right of association beyond the traditional first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and petition from which it is derived. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States248 the Court was confronted with the issue of whether Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 applied to the tourism industry. The defendant had argued that its
clientele preferred to stay in an all-white motel, and thus, that if Title II applied, the
discrimination would be terminated but the business would suffer severe financial
losses. The Court held that Title II's prohibition on discrimination or segregation on
the basis of race, color, religion or national origin by places of public accommodation
did not impinge upon the constitutional guarantees of due process or personal liberty.
The Court declared that a motel operator has "no right to select its guests as it sees
fit, free from governmental regulation." 2 49 A similar prohibition should apply to law
firms under Title VII; the right of a law firm to select its partners is not a right that is
or should be constitutionally protected from governmental regulation.
Even in cases arising in a noneconomic context, the Court has balanced the
alleged associational rights against the purposes served by the contested regulation.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas25 ° a group of college students challenged a zoning
245. Id. at 176.
246. Id. (emphasis in original).
247. Id. (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,469-70 (1973)). See also L. TRIBE, AmERJcAN CoNS rrrr AL
LAw 702 (1976).
248. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
249. Id. at 259. The Court was unmoved by the motel operator's argument of potential adverse economic con-
sequences. The Court declared this of no consequence because that a "member of the class which is regulated may suffer
economic losses not shared by others ... has never been a barrier" to federal antidiscrimination legislation. Id. at 260
(citing Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944)). A federal district court recently held that the United States
Jaycees could not exclude women members because the state had demonstrated its commitment to prohibiting discrimination
in access to public accommodation on the basis of sex. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766,771 (D. Minn.
1982). The State's interest was compelling, thereby overcoming any right to associate that the Jaycees had urged. The court
rejected the Jaycees' contention that it would be destroyed by allowing women to become members, declaring that there was
nothing to prohibit young men from enjoying the benefits of the Jaycees if women became members. Id. at 772. Cf. Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
250. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings. The ordinance's definition
of "family" permitted occupancy by an unlimited number of persons that were
related by blood, marriage, or adoption, but precluded occupancy of a dwelling by
more than two unrelated persons. The Court rejected the students' argument that the
ordinance infringed their fundamental constitutional rights of privacy and associa-
tion, holding that economic and social legislation alleged to be violative of the Equal
Protection Clause will be upheld merely if "'reasonable, not arbitrary,'" and if it
"bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective."'25' In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland2 52 the Court retreated from this position only minimally when
it held that a housing ordinance permitting only certain categories of related persons
to live together was an intrusive regulation of family life and therefore infringed the
freedom of personal choice in marriage and family matters protected by the Constitu-
tion: "This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by [the Constitution].""
Nevertheless, the Court refused to adopt a per se rule of invalidity of laws infringing
familial associational rights. The Moore decision acknowledged that the statute in-
volved therein could have survived constitutional attack had it been shown to serve an
important governmental interest. 4 If the Court is, under certain circumstances,
willing to override the associational right for cases arising out of family relationships,
certainly it should be willing to do so in the context of the selection of one's business
partners, 5 5 if the important governmental interest in eradicating employment dis-
crimination is served thereby.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the individual's associational rights
in the context of social institutions, the lower courts have followed the reluctance of
the Supreme Court to extend this right beyond political, social or religious
organizations.2 6 In Lucido the court expressly declared that the first amendment
privacy or associational rights do not exist for a commercial, profit-making business
organization.2 5 7 The Supreme Court has declared that the right of privacy protects
activities "relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education." ' s Despite the district court's dubious analogy in
Hishon between a law firm partnership and marriage, cases recognizing these first
amendment rights refer to social organizations, and not business organizations.
2 9
251. Id. at 8 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
252. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
253. Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
254. Id. See also Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
255. Note, supra note 120, at 317.
256. See supra note 237. See also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (state's interest not sufficient to
compel seating of one of two delegations at 1972 Democratic National Convention, since qualifications of delegation are a
matter for internal determination by a party protected by associational rights of a political party); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410
F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (need compelling state interest and no alternative means in order to impede Muslim
prisoners' observance of dietary creed).
257. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
258. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted).
259. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483-86 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462-63
(1958), with Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92-95 (1974).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The denial of partnership operates in the realm of economic opportunities; thus, it is
outside the purview of traditional associational rights.
260
Because the Court in the past 30 years has allowed the state and federal government wide
latitude in restricting the business activities and because a law firm is essentially a
business activity, albeit one with strong personal, social, and perhaps even political
overtones, it is unlikely that a law firm would be successful in arguing that it has a
constitutionally protected right to deny partnership to a female.
261
Privacy and associational rights were designed to insulate an individual's social
relationships from governmental interference, and allowing law firm partners to use
these rights to discriminate in an economic context denigrates their fundamental
purpose.
But even if a court found that a law firm partnership did deserve first amendment
associational rights, the application of Title VII to the partnership selection process
would not violate those rights. Title VII would not prevent the partners from associa-
ting for political, social, and economic goals, nor prohibit them from joining or
forming associations. 262 The partners are still able to select business associates, but
their selection cannot be based on an impermissible classification. The discretionary,
subjective judgments involved in the partnership promotion decisions are not limited
by the application of Title VII except to preclude consideration of factors of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin in the promotion process. 263 The liberty of
action of the law firm partnership is constrained only to meet the purposes of the Act.
Title VII simply grants a qualified individual an equal opportunity to be considered
for partnership.
In summation, the Supreme Court has never extended privacy and associational
rights derived from the first amendment beyond a social or familial relationship, and
discriminatory selection systems of law firm partnerships are therefore outside the
purview of traditional associational rights applications. This form of discrimination
limits access to economic benefits and restricts, simply on the basis of sex or some
other arbitrary classification, the freedom of an individual to pursue a chosen
vocation. 264 Partnerships engaging in discrimination surely are not deserving of
constitutional protection. Moreover, even if a court found that the right of association
extended to an economic relationship such as a law firm partnership, the strong
260. Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 449 (1974):
If there is a private right to discriminate, it is derived from the notion implicit in the privacy decisions-that at
some point no government may intrude into the private affairs of men and women .... [That] point is reached,
if at all, when the discriminatory act involves few people and is only marginally related to market place concerns
and the basic resources of our society.
Id. at 523.
261. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 1051, 1107 n.93 (1967).
262. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497, 501 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 242-47.
263. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel &
Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
264. Note, supra note 120, at 317.
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national policy against discrimination would be a sufficiently compelling state inter-
est to override any associational rights urged by a partnership to justify discriminatory
selection practices. 265
3. Effect of State Laws
The application of Title VII to partnership promotion decisions may conflict
with state laws if the state requires unanimous consent of all partners as a prerequisite
to partnership status. 26 6 Title VII takes precedence, however, over any state laws that
permit employment practices prohibited by Title VII. 2 67 Under the Supremacy
Clause 268 and the preemption doctrine, Title VII overrides the state partnership laws
to the extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of the federal statute. 2 6 9 The Lucido
court expressly recognized this principle when it declared that were state laws requir-
ing the unanimous consent of all partners for entry inconsistent with the application of
Title VII, the federal statute would prevail. 270
4. The Subjective Selection Process
The impact of Title VII on law fim partnerships may turn on whether a court
feels sufficiently competent to scrutinize subjective employee evaluation pro-
cesses.271 Promotion to partnership has been analogized to university appointments
and tenure, on the basis of the subjective assessments required in the decision making
process.272 These professional level appointments and promotions typically involve
discretionary choices by the employer and subjective evaluations that examine com-
petence, personal interests, personality, integrity, motivation, and ability to work
with others. This discretion by the decision makers allows the expression of personal
bias and invites selection of candidates resembling those doing the selecting.273
Despite the potential abuses of a discretionary system, some courts adamantly refuse
265. Id. at 316. The strong national policy against sex discrimination has been used by the courts in other employ-
ment discrimination cases to reject constitutional arguments. In Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982), the district court applied the Equal Pay Act to a Baptist controlled college, rejecting the college's argument
that application of the Act would violate either the free exercise clause or the establishment clause.
266. See UmN-ormt PARTmsttsw Acr § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914) ("No person can become a member of a
partnership without the consent of all partners.")
267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976).
268. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
269. See Note, supra note 113, at 476.
270. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
271. See generally Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REv. 737 (1976);
Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DEr. J. UR. L. 165
(1976); Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. Rev. 1614 (1973).
272. See Bardeen, supra note 91, at 362-63; Note, supra note 113.
273. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947, 996 (1982). One New York
law firm embroiled in an employment discrimination suit attempted to describe and defend its procedure for selecting
associates as follows:
The record of the applicant is, of course, a starting point, but in every case the final decision is also predicated
upon subjective factors such as sincerity, appearance, poise, and the ability to understand and articulate
conceptual matters .... Only during the interview at the Firm is an evaluation of the intangible factors
discussed above possible. Thus, the initial impression of the applicant is of necessity a lasting one. Much
depends upon the "chemistry" which occurs between the applicant and the interviewers. It is impossible to
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to intervene when the employment relationship involves highly subjective selection
criteria.2
74
Although Title VII does not prohibit the use of subjective criteria,275 courts have
criticized the protection of these criteria in deciding employment discrimination
claims for lower level positions.276 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody27 7 the Supreme
Court criticized a subjective performance rating system because there was no way to
determine whether the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related to the
company's interest in placing the best qualified people in the jobs. The criterion of
success-who is doing a better job-was "extremely vague and fatally open to
divergent interpretations," leading the Court to declare that there was "no way of
knowing precisely what criteria of job performance the supervisors were considering,
whether each of the supervisors was considering the same criteria or whether, indeed,
any of the supervisors applied a focused and stable body of criteria of any kind. "278
In Rowe v. General Motors Corp.27 9 the supervisory personnel failed to receive
instructions pertaining to the qualifications necessary for promotion. The Fifth Cir-
cuit declared that subjective processes are ready mechanisms of discrimination and
that objective and reviewable criteria should be used whenever subjective evaluation
results in adverse discrimination.
2 80
Despite the substantial criticism of subjective evaluation systems for lower level
positions, the courts have exhibited greater tolerance and have been less inclined to
condemn them for professional level occupations. 2 8' It is arguable with respect to
exaggerate the importance of this aspect of the interview, for a person with excellent grades may well simply fail
to impress that small number of persons who have the ultimate selection responsibility.
Id. at 996 (citing G. CooPER, H. RABB & H. Rutml, FAno EMPLOYMENT LMGATION 192 (1975)) (which quotes
Defendant's Brief, Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094
(2d Cir. 1974)).
274. See Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (,v.D. La. 1975). This hands-off
approach by the courts was especially evident in academic employment cases. See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d
1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Of all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and
faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal court supervision."); Megill v. Board of
Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 810 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1378, 1354 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp.
1264, 1270 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D. Vt. 1976); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of
Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D. Mass. 1975); Labat v. Board of Higher Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
275. Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982).
276. Cases criticizing subjective evaluation for lower level jobs include: Crawford v. Westem Elec. Co., 614 F.2d
1300, 1315-17 & nn.29-30 (5th Cir. 1980); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 328 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 433 U.S.
299 (1977); Senter v. General Motors Corp. 532 F.2d 511,528-30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Baxter
v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 440-41, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Hester v. Souther
Ry., 349 F. Supp. 812, 817 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974).
277. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
278. Id. at 433.
279. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). The promotional practices violated Title VII in five respects: The supervisor's
recommendation was a condition precedent to employment, the supervisors were not given any written instructions as to
the necessary qualifications, controlling standards were vague and subjective, employees were not notified of the quali-
fications necessary for promotion, and there were no procedural safeguards to avert arbitrary decisions. Id. at 358-59.
280. Id. at 359. See also Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 105 (5th Cir. 1976).
281. Hereford v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 574 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1978) (subjectivity in promotional decisions
at the professional level, particularly at a competitive level, is not a violation of the law because the employer must be able
to make personal and subjective judgments). See also Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th
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upper echelon management and professional positions that subjective criteria are
"not to be condemned as unlawful per se; in all fairness to applicants and employers
alike, decisions about hiring and promotion in upper-level jobs cannot realistically be
made using objective techniques alone.' '282 Employers should recognize, however,
the possibility of arbitrariness in subjective selection procedures and the potential for
abuse. 2
83
Lawyers filing Title VII claims have been unsuccessful in attacks on allegedly
discriminatory practices resulting from subjective employment criteria. In Milton v.
Bell Laboratories, Inc. 284 the court declared that a judgment of an employer in hiring
an attorney may be subjective, but the decision must be vigorously reviewed to
ensure that it is not masking an impermissible bias. 285 Relying on a McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green286 analysis, however, the court denied plaintiff's claim. The
court found sufficient objective evidence to substantiate the company's subjective
decision that the plaintiff was not qualified for the position.287
In Frausto v. Legal Aid Society of San Diego, Inc. 288 the Ninth Circuit dis-
missed an attorney's claim of discriminatory hiring practices. Plaintiff had argued
that objective evidence of a higher grade-point average and prior work experience
made him more qualified than those who had received employment. The court re-
jected plaintiff's contentions, holding that a "poor interview, an unstable employ-
ment history [two jobs in two years], a poor reputation in the legal community and the
inability to get along with people are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for reject-
ing [plaintiffs] employment application and are sufficient to defeat an employment
discrimination action under Title VII . . ,,289 In Falkenheiner v. Legal Aid Society
of Baton Rouge, Inc. 290 a federal court denied the sex discrimination charge of a
woman who was twice rejected for the position of executive director of the Society.
Although the plaintiff had extensive management experience within the organization
and had served as interim director during a vacancy, the court refused to question the
Cir. 1978); Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1286 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978); Frausto v. Legal Aid Soc'y of San Diego, Inc., 563
F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977); Falkenheiner v. Legal Aid Soc'y of Baton Rouge, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 429, 435 (M.D.
La. 1979), EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 445 F. Supp. 223, 254-55 (D. Del. 1978); Agarwal v. Arthur G.
McKee & Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8301, at 5570, 5578 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 644 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1981);
Frink v. United States Navy, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67, 69-70 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd mem., 609 F.2d 501 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980); Keely v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 573,579-80 (E.D. Mo.
1975); Levens v. General Services Admin., 391 F. Supp. 35, 36 (W.D. Mo. 1975), affdmem., 538 F.2d 332 (8th Cir.
1978). This fluctuating standard was explained in Canty v. Olivarez, 452 F. Supp. 762, 769 (N.D. Ga. 1978): "IMhe
degree of subjectivity permitted in assessing an applicant's qualifications varies with the duties of the position sought and
the selecting party's professional interaction with an applicant." See generally Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria
and the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DEr. J. URt. L. 165, 186 (1976); Waintroob, The Developing Law
of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 45, 51 (1979).
282. Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir. 1975); Hester v. Southern Ry., 394 F. Supp.
812 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974).
283. See Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 CoLum. L. REv. 1614, 1632
(1973).
284. 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977).
285. Id. at 507.
286. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
287. Milton v. Bell Laboratories, 428 F. Supp. 502, 514-15 (D.N.J. 1977).
288. 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1977).
289. Id. at 1329.
290. 471 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. La. 1979).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
decision of her employer regarding her application. The court reasoned that because
the required job qualifications were written and the Board of Directors had clearly
articulated written, unambiguous business reasons for the decision, plaintiff's claim
must fail. 2
91
A plaintiff must prove discrimination by either coming forward with direct
evidence or demonstrating that the employer had, at some time, given him or her a
favorable evaluation in terms of legitimate subjective criteria.2 92 Thus, the mere use
of subjective criteria by an employer does not by itself establish an inference of
discrimination or a prima facie case.
293
On the other hand, statistical evidence demonstrating the absence of female
partners may support a prima facie case of sex discrimination, 294 although litigants
who are successful in establishing that an employment practice discriminates against
them may still be required to rebut an employer's justification of the practice.
Although the court found in Fogg v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. 29 5
that because of the employer's promotion policy a female employee had suffered a
discriminatory denial of promotional opportunities, the court nonetheless denied re-
lief, stating that the woman's aggressive and ambitious character justifed the decision
of the company:
While these traits are supposedly ones that make for success in business, they also run
counter to the tendency of any bureaucratic hierarchy to perpetuate itself and protect its
members against any sudden change or disruption of the established routine.... [W]hat
the Company required at this management level was primarily conformity and the ability
to get along with other personnel.
296
Although Title VII theoretically eliminated employment decisions based on
sexual sterotypes,297 female attorneys are still struggling to overcome paternalistic
assumptions, thus making them particularly susceptible to subjective employment
criteria. Law fin evaluation systems use largely unarticulated, cryptic criteria de-
veloped and refined by men. 298 Stereotypic assumptions create the equivalent of a
bona fide occupational exception that employers use to escape the jurisdiction of Title
VII, although the Supreme Court has held that stereotypic impressions of male and
female roles do not qualify gender as a bona fide occupational qualification. 299 It has
been postulated, for example, that the manner and psychology of women are poorly
291. Id. at 435.
292. Note, supra note 120, at 305-06.
293. Eubanks v. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co., 635 F.2d 1341, 1347 (8th Cir. 1980); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1980).
294. See Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DE-r. J.
URB. L. 165, 222(1976). In a disparate impact case, statiatical comparisons are the central form ofproof. SeeGriggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). For disparate treatment cases, the Supreme Court has declared that statistical proof
may be used as competent evidence to prove employment discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977).
295. 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972).
296. Id. at 649.
297. See supra text accompanying note 22.
298. See Margolik, Wall Street's Sexist Wall, NAT'L L.J., August 4, 1980 at 58, col. 2.
299. Los Angeles Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
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suited to the professional requirements of an adversary system. 300 Courts have also
encountered, and have striven to eradicate, presumptions based on allegedly innate
characteristics such as the belief that men are better able to conceal their feelings and
thus are better suited for competition in the legal arena. Another justification re-
peatedly urged by employers is that clients prefer to transact business with male law-
yers, and therefore, a female attorney would be detrimental to the profit-making
capacity of a firm.3 °1 The courts, however, as well as the EEOC, traditionally have
refused to allow discriminatory employment practices based on customer pre-
ference.302
What is probably the most frequently raised complaint about women lawyers is
that they are not totally committed to their careers because they give their husbands
and families priority over their job and the firm.30 3 Courts have taken a dim view,
however, of discrimination based on marital status; 30 4 such arguments may be viewed
as mere pretexts and wholly inadequate grounds for discriminatory practices.30 5 The
imposition of employment preferences based on sex is permissible only when the
essence of the business would be undermined by not utilizing members of one sex
exclusively. 30 6 Moreover, the obligation imposed upon the employer to avoid sex-
based stereotyping is not unduly burdensome. One court has pointed out that
"although a law firm is [allowed] to make complex, subjective judgments as to how
impressive an applicant is, it is not free to inject into the selection process the a priori
assumption that, as a whole, women are less acceptable professionally than men. "307
Thus, although courts will review the selection process when it contains a measure of
procedural unfairness or bias, the methodology of the system may remain intact.
The complex nature of a professional job and the lack of objectively verifiable
standards of adequate performance require the courts to adopt a more sophisticated
approach to employment discrimination problems than that used for lower level
positions. Courts must reject the stereotypes connected with women attorneys and
focus on the particular facts of the case before them. The problem requires an
individualistic approach because of the nature of subjective judgments. If the plaintiff
establishes a case of employment discrimination based on subjective employment
300. Pearson & Sachs, Barristers and Gentlemen: A Critical Look at Sexism in the Profession, 43 MOD. L. REV. 400,
408 (1980).
301. Note, Self Defense for Women Lawyers: Enforcement of Employment Rights, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 517, 532
(1971).
302. See, e.g., EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1 )(iii) (1982); Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), (failure to hire male flight attendants not justified by passenger
preference), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir.) (stereotyped
customer preference does not justify sexually discriminatory practice), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1981); Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 303 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV.
1051, 1102-03 (1967).
303. See Margolik, Wall Street's Sexist Wall, NAT'L L.J., August 4, 1980 at 1, col. 1; P. HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE
EIGHTIES 213 (1982).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
305. These common perceptions of female attorneys were analyzed and rejected in White, Women in the Law, 65
MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1088-95 (1967).
306. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1971).
307. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515,521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094(2nd
Cir. 1974) (emphasis in the original).
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criteria, the court should place the burden on the employer to produce a reasonable
explanation of the system and how it operates. 308 Indeed, the rejection of an other-
wise qualified individual on the basis of subjective considerations entitles the plaintiff
"to the benefit of an inference of discrimination, which inference requires the de-
fendants to come forward and articulate legitimate reasons for her [the plaintiff' s]
non-selection." 3 °9 The employer should explain (1) what the job entails and what
constitutes effective performance, (2) the basis used to conclude that the system is
selecting the best employee, (3) whether any less discriminatory methods of selection
exist, and, if so, (4) why those systems of selection would not work as well as the one
chosen by the employer. 310 This approach is not a rejection of the meritocratic
method of employee analysis; rather, it simply allows courts to explore whether a
reasonable justification exists for the employer's subjective selection. "When any
selection procedure is used, the essential principle is that evidence be accumulated to
show a relationship between decisions based on assessments made by that procedure
and criteria such as job performance.... 311
The selection of persons for promotions on the basis of ability, work record,
performance, and merit is legitimate and not prohibited by Title VII, provided that
even if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer can
demonstrate that the selection of one person over another is not the result of an
intention to discriminate.3 12 Selection systems utilizing subjective factors can be
legitimated by the employer demonstrating that the employment decision was not
arbitrary, but rather the result of a rational, fair system. 3 13 Criteria such as wealth,
social status, and personal relationships, however, allow the expression of personal
bias, thereby defeating the purposes of merit-based selection and perpetuating the
status quo.314 Requiring justification for an employer's selection processes would not
place an undue burden on the employer, and it would allow a court to arrive at a more
judicious determination of whether the practice has impermissibly violated the man-
date of Title VII. Courts should not hesitate to subject selection procedures of upper
308. Objective job qualifications should be examined at step one of the McDonnellDouglas analysis, and subjective
criteria are best treated at the later stages of the process. Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.
1981).
309. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
310. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 947, 997-98 (1982).
311. DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N., PRINCIPLES FOR
THE VALIDATION AND USE OF PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCEDuRES I (2d ed. 1980).
312. Kelley v. Norfolk & W. Ky. Ry. Co., 458 F. Supp. 244, 252 (D. Va. 1977), affd, 584 F.2d 34 (4th Cir.
1978).
313. See, e.g., Brown v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 31,528 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (dis-
criminatory denial of promotion allegation rejected because employer's evaluation form was specific, the supervisors were
given adequate guidelines, evaluation process safeguards included review by higher management levels, the supervisor's
evaluation was open to employee examination, and the evaluation of the supervisor was not the single determinative factor
in the employment decision).
314. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. Rav. 947, 996 (1982).
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level employers to close scrutiny simply because discretionary, subjective judgments
are used. The obligation of a court to fulfill the mandate of Title VII should alleviate
any reluctance a court may have about reviewing subjective employment criteria.315
V. REMEDIES FOR A TITLE VII LITIGANT
If a court finds that an employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful employ-
ment practice, the court may order any equitable relief it deems appropriate. 316 The
remedy granted should reflect the purposes of Title VIl-prohibition of discrimina-
tion and compensation for injuries incurred. The Supreme Court has declared that a
court's remedy should demonstrate that the policy outlawing inequality in employ-
ment opportunity receives the highest priority.317 Title VII attempts to make a victim
whole insofar as possible,31 8 but it does not place the victim in a better position than
she would have been absent the discrimination. 319 A court has extensive discretion in
selecting an appropriate remedy and is restricted only if the individual was denied
employment opportunities for any reason other than discrimination. 320 Courts have
applied the traditional Title VII remedies when discrimination has been proved in
professional employment situations.3 21 Although discriminatory denial of partnership
promotion may pose a unique situation, a court should not be deterred from formulat-
ing appropriate remedies.
A. Injunctive Relief
Courts may order injunctive relief and appropriate affirmative action including
reinstatement, hiring, promotion or any other equitable relief that the court deems
315. Several commentators have argued that judicial reluctance to interfere with subjective selection processes for
upper level positions stems from the judges' former employment as attorneys. "Judges defer to the employers with whom
they identify, and they uphold the kinds of selection systems from which they have benefitted." Bartholet, Application of
Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947, 979 (1982). See also Note, supra note 113, at 473.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See generally Isaac, A Survey of Remedies Under Title VII, 5 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 437 (1973).
317. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v Moody, 422 U.S. 405,416
(1975).
318. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
319. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). This provision requires the plaintiff to prove that she would have been
promoted if she had not been discriminated against. See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1977). But see
Wang v. Hoffman, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cans. (BNA) 703, 705 (1982) (employee does not have to prove that, but for the
discrimination, he would have been promoted).
321. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (back pay and reinstatement with promotion to
tenured position for discriminatory denial of tenure); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977) (two retroactive
promotions for a black engineer); Foster v. Simon, 467 F. Supp. 533 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (retroactive promotion for a
female tax auditor); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec. Inc., No. 74 C. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (corporation required to hire
female attorney), rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D.
Mass. 1975) (preliminary injunction compelling reinstatement); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397 (D. Or.
1970) (corporation must offer accounting position to black person), affd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. Commw. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976) (lawyer reinstated
after retaliatory dismissal). But see EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denial of
reinstatement for advertising executive, but money damages allowed), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
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appropriate. 322 "A determination of whether injunctive relief is appropriate hinges on
a balance of the various equities between the parties and the result must be consistent
with the purpose of Title VII and the 'fundamental concepts of fairness."' 323 While
injunctive relief requiring a restoration of an associate to partnership status in her
former law firm would be the most liberal remedy a court could order, it most closely
approximates the purposes of Title VII's remedy provisions. In Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong3 24 the plaintiff had filed a charge
with a state civil rights agency alleging that her employer had denied her advance-
ment to partnership because of her sex and age. When the law firmn learned of her
action, she was placed on an indeterminate leave of absence with pay. The court
ordered her reinstatement, holding that although the plaintiff was receiving her sal-
ary, she was deprived of office space and other services as well as the prestige that
comes from being an associate with a good law firm.325
The Thorp case, however, proceeded under a retaliation theory rather than under
a strict denial of employment opportunities approach. Although the scenario posed by
Hishon is not a retaliatory firing, it is a discharge resulting from the law fin's
employment policy. Under the broad discretion granted by Title VII, a court has the
authority to order reinstatement and promotion for an associate who was forced to
resign because of a firm's up or out policy. Furthermore, if the court decided to award
partnership status to the former employee, it would be complying with Title VII's
mandate that the elimination of discrimination is sufficiently important to overcome
the interest in privacy and associational rights that a law finm partnership would
advance.
Ordering reinstatement and promotion of an attorney to partnership status may
not, however, be appropriate in every situation.326 At common law, breach of a
contract for personal service generally led to awards of monetary relief rather than
specific performance. 327 Courts prefer not to impose potentially adverse relationships
322. 42 U.S.t. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See generally Affirmative Action Symposium, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1199
(1980); Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1976); Davidson,
Preferential Treatment and Equal Opportunity, 55 OR. L. Rav. 53 (1976); Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies
for Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1975). A remedial order by the court will be either proscriptive or
corrective. Proscriptive orders require the employer to cease the illegal practice, whereas corrective orders substitute new
employment practices for the improper methods. G. COOPER, H. RABB, & H. RuBN, FAIR EMPLOYMvENr LrnOAmON,
430 (1975). Affirmative action practices are permissible when the preference given to protected members of a class is
designed to remedy specific or identifiable past discrimination rather than general social discrimination. Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09 (1978).
323. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598,603 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Williams v. General Foods
Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 1974)). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination Suits by Professionals:
Should the Reinstatement Remedy be Granted?, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 103, 108 (1977).
324. 25 Pa. Commw. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976).
325. Id. at 304, 361 A.2d at 502. Retaliation for filing a discrimination charge with a proper agency is also illegal
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
326. Similarly, in a discriminatory hiring practices action, the nature of the legal field may present obstacles to
injunctive relief. In Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1979) the court reversed the
district court's order granting injunctive relief that required the defendant employer to hire the plaintiff as a corporate
attorney. A hiring order is not appropriate unless the person discriminated against is presently qualified to assume the
position sought. Id. at 603 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747,772 n.31 (1976)). The court found
the plaintiff unqualified to assume the position sought because substantial changes had occurred since plaintiff had had any
significant corporate law experience. Id. at 603.
327. See Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CoRNELL L.Q. 235, 238 (1921).
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on litigants, as this too much resembles involuntary servitude.328 A court must weigh
fulfillment of the purposes of Title VII against the law firm's need to continue
functioning as a business entity. Animosity between the parties may have escalated to
the point at which reinstatement would create an intolerable situation. 329 The law
firm's internal affairs may be disrupted significantly if the partnership agreement
requires unanimous consent of all partners before a new partner can be admitted. Law
firm partners generally participate equally in the management of the firn, and a
person placed within their midst without their consent may have a disruptive effect
upon the successful operation of the fimn.
If a plaintiff is successful in proving her case, however, the court must formulate
an appropriate remedy. If the plaintiff wins, she must have shown that she was
qualified for the position denied her; therefore, her competence should not be a
hindrance in the court's formulation. The risk of detrimental effect upon the firm's
profit-making capacity will be diminished because the firm will be ordered to accept
only qualified attorneys as partners.
Associational problems should be examined in the context of the probable rela-
tions within the group of colleagues with whom the plaintiff would work if reinstated
with partnership status. 330 The size and complexity of the law firm, the nature of its
professional working relationships, and its support of the plaintiff are important
characteristics to be considered by the court.3 31 In a Hishon situation, injunctive
relief may be appropriate because of the size of the law firm. The magnitude and
diversity of practice in a large firm diminishes the opportunity for direct con-
frontation.332 When a law firm has a large number of lawyers, the plaintiff's relation-
ship with each individual partner or associate is of less importance, and the court
should concentrate on the plaintiff's ability to function effectively within her particu-
lar department.
B. Monetary Damages
An award of back pay is the most popular remedy sought under Title VII.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, back pay is awarded as the most complete relief
possible for the proscribed discrimination.333 The Supreme Court has held that an
employer's good faith is not a sufficient reason for denying back pay. 334 Back pay
liability can accrue from two years prior to the filing of a charge, but any amount
328. See 5A A. CoRam, CoRauN oN CoNrRAcrs § 1204 (1964).
329. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (so much animosity
present that reinstatement of the plaintiff not a workable remedy), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). See also Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980).
330. Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MiCH. L.
REv. 282, 320 (1978).
331. Note, supra note 113, at 469.
332. See Note, Employment Discrimination Suits by Professionals: Should the Reinstatement Remedy Be Granted?,
39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 103, 115 (1977).
333. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
334. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975).
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earned by the plaintiff in the interim shall act as a set-off.3 35 Legal employers have
not been immune to back pay awards. In Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric,
Inc.3 3 6 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was eligible for back pay when the
company failed to hire her for a corporate attorney position.337 Plaintiff's damages
were established by measuring the difference between her actual earnings and those
that she would have earned absent the discrimination.33 8 The court held that any
uncertainty in determining what an employee would have earned should be resolved
against the discriminating employer.339
Although a court could award an associate back pay from the time of termination
resulting from an adverse partnership decision, the alternative to awarding partner-
ship status (reinstatement concurrent with promotion) is the theory of front pay.34°
Front pay is equitable monetary relief for any future loss of earnings resulting from
discriminatory conduct of the defendant. 341 In EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 3 4
the federal district court refused reinstatement because of the animosity caused
by litigation, but awarded the plaintiff front pay calculated to compensate her until
she could find equivalent employment. 343 Awards of front pay are designed to
"further the goals of ending illegal discrimination and rectifying the harm it
causes." 344 Front pay may be embraced by some courts because of the general
hesitancy to award either compensatory 345 or punitive damages3 46 that are not ex-
plicitly authorized by the statutory "other equitable relief."
335. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974,
976 (9th Cir. 1978).
336. 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979).
337. Id. at 602.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 603 n.6 (citing United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976)).
340. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
625 F.2d 918, 932 (10th Cir. 1979); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 590 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
341. Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, 12 Fair Empil. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 895, 914 (W.D.N.C. 1975), affdin part, 575
F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979).
342. 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920
(1977).
343. See also Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945,957 (10th Cir. 1980) (award of front pay in lieu of
reinstatement is appropriate where reinstatement inadvisable because of past hostile and discriminatory treatment); EEOC
v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (front pay given where reinstatement
inappropriate).
344. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
345. See Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir.
1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butter Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 194-97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1978);
Pearson v. Western Elee. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1976); Charles v. National Tea Co., 488 F. Supp. 270,
276 (W.D. La. 1980); Wilson v. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (D. Colo. 1979); Schofield v. Stetson, 459 F. Supp.
998, 999 (D. Ga. 1978); Dual v. Griffin, 446 F. Supp. 791, 800 n.40 (D.D.C. 1977); Curran v. Portland Superintending
School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1078 (D. Me. 1977); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 855m-56
(N.D. Ga. 1974). But see Rosen v. Public Serv. Elee. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973) (compensatory damages
can be awarded for Title VII action); Ahmad v. Independent Order of Foresters, 81 F.R.D. 722, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(compensatory damages are available in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland
Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 838 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (employee may be awarded damages for emotional distress and
loss of experience), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1974).
346. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); Miller v. Texas State
Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980); DeGraece v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980);
LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP DECISIONS
Front pay is equal to expected future earnings. In a case involving denial of
partnership status, the amount would equal the difference between the associate's
current salary and the average compensation received by individuals who became
partners concurrent with the adverse decision for the complainant. Although the
discharged associate would have to mitigate the damages by seeking comparable
employment, the law firm would still incur significant liability based on the differ-
ence between her new salary and that paid to partners in her former firm.347
There are, however, several impediments to the awarding of monetary damages
in the form of front pay. Front pay for lawyers would be difficult to compute because
front pay is based on future earnings, and a partner's share fluctuates, depending
upon the prosperity of the firm. Front pay envisions substantial monetary awards, and
therefore it may be difficult to convince a court to award complete relief. Addition-
ally, the threat of a large damage award with front pay could force law firms to settle
unmeritorious claims, thereby encouraging the filing of Title VII claims, regardless
of their merit.
Furthermore, front pay is not a satisfactory remedy for all plaintiffs. The pur-
pose of Title VII is to "make the person whole" and restore her to the position that
she would have achieved but for the discrimination. A monetary damage award may
compensate for one aspect of the effect of discrimination, but the individual remains
without the prestige, job security, personal satisfaction, and enhanced professional
responsibilities that the job denied her would have encompassed. 348 Similarly, front
pay will not compensate an attorney for diminished employment opportunities if she
is unable to find another comparable job.349 Moreover, even if the attorney is able to
find another position, she may not be as valuable to her new employer as she was in
her former job, where her substantive knowledge, familiarity with law firm pro-
cedures, and contacts with clients were accumulated through several years of experi-
ence.
Attorneys' fees may be awarded as an additional form of monetary damages
available to Title VII litigants. A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attor-
neys' fees unless special circumstances exist that would render such an award un-
just. 350 Attorneys' fees are granted because the plaintiff in a Title VII action assumes
the role of a private attorney general, and is responsible for implementing the con-
gressional policy of encouraging individuals to undertake vindication of the strongly
Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1977), EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F. Supp.
1063, 1078 (D. Me. 1977); Jiron v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 423 F. Supp. 155, 165 (D. Utah 1975). But see Waters v.
Heublein, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA) 908, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (plaintiff entitled to recover punitive damages
if she can prove defendents acted with necessary malice), rev'd on other grounds, 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 161
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (punitive damages might be proper award under Title VII).
347. Indeed, after her dismissal, Ms. Hishon began working for another Atlanta law firm, thereby fulfilling her
responsibility to mitigate the damages. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prae. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,064.
348. See generally Note, supra note 113, at 465. See also supra text accompanying note 325.
349. See generally Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Note, Employment
Discrimination Suits by Professionals: Should the Reinstatement Remedy Be Granted?, 39 U. PriT. L. REv. 103, 113
(1977).
350. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
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expressed national policy against discrimination.35 1 Similarly, a prevailing defendant




Hishon is one of the few discrimination suits brought against law firms to have
reached the adjudicatory stage. Since the expense of pursuing a claim through the
trial stage is becoming prohibitively large, many suits are settled out of court prior to
the trial date. An analysis of settlements is necessary, however, because the pro-
ceedings to obtain court approval of a settlement agreement require a hearing on the
appropriateness of the remedies. Thus, an approved settlement is nearly equivalent to
the remedy resulting from a fully litigated case. 35 3 Several settlements of law firm
discrimination suits have been publicized and serve as potential guidelines for parties
seeking a resolution of their differences. 3
54
In Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell35 5 a federal district court settled the suit by
allowing review by plaintiff of hiring, assignments, promotion, and salary schedules
of women and men, review of salary and bonus information relating to associates,
and information as to associate appraisals. 356 The firm was required to appoint an
administrator to ensure that the defendant was not pursuing discriminatory employ-
ment practices. The plaintiffs also were to review all recruiting materials, interview
guidelines, and records on interviewing. The firm anticipated that the number of
women offered employment in the future would be comparable to the percentage of
female applicants for a particular year. The firm was ordered to request from each law
school designated in the plan information on the number of men and women in the
second and third year classes. Defendant also paid plaintiff's counsel $30,000 in legal
fees.
In Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells35 7 the federal district court settlement
awarded $40,000 to the plaintiff and ordered quotas for job offers to women whereby
351. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980); Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406, 410-11 (1st
Cir. 1978); Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Johnson v. United States, 554 F.2d 632, 633 (4th Cir. 1977).
352. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). The following factors have been used by
courts in determining appropriate fee awards:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the skill requisite to properly perform the legal services; (3)[the] preclusion
of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
presented; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.
Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (lst Cir.
1978); Copeland v. Marshall, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 468 (App. D.C. 1978); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557
F.2d 1015, 1018 (3d Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
353. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1977).
354. See generally Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54
U. Dr. J. URB. L. 165, 224-27 (1976).
355. 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
356. Id. at 3. See also Bardeen, supra note 91 at 365; P. HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EoiTrrIs 211-12 (1982).
357. 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974). The firm is now called
Rogers & Wells.
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for three years, the firm would give job offers to 20 percent more women than the
percentage of women in the graduating classes at the law schools where it recruited.
The court ordered the firm to use rational criteria such as academic success, ability to
understand and communicate conceptual ideas, and judgmental ability.3 58 The settle-
ment obviously was designed to objectify the evaluations of the candidate's quali-
fications and to inject a degree of job-relatedness into the selection criteria. The firm
also was required to request the clubs in which it had established memberships to
reverse their all-male policies. 359 Additionally, the firm had to invite and encourage
women attorneys to participate, on the same basis as men, in firm-sponsored social
events and meetings with clients. The firn could not organize or sponsor any events
or meetings in clubs where women were excluded from membership. 36° These settle-
ments demonstrate that Title VII can be used by women to attack the traditional
methods of discrimination practiced by large institutionalized law firms.
VI. AVOIDANCE OF TITLE VII PROBLEMS
A. Compliance
The practical test of compliance is how well the firm's employment policies
would stand up in court. If the firn is charged with discrimination because a woman
was not promoted, the partnership may have to demonstrate that some male em-
ployees with qualifications equal to hers also were passed over. A legitimate reason
for denying promotion opportunities is that the unsuccessful candidates did not meas-
ure up to the employer's standards to the same extent as the person finally selected.
3 61
In Hishon the plaintiff's position was not unique because potential male candidates
for partnership were similarly refused. In a footnote, the majority opinion in Hishon
declared, "It is significant to note that the partnership made the same [negative]
decision with respect to two male associates, while other male associates within the
',-362
group were invited to join the partnership. Although this evidence did not, in and
of itself, prove that King & Spalding did not discriminate against the plaintiff, the
majority may have inferred that the law firm had not unlawfully discriminated in
excluding her and that the denial of partnership stemmed from some inadequacy of
the associate.
When a denial of partnership results in termination, the law firm should be able
to justify its decision with evidence of the associate's unsatisfactory performance.
The law firm should document each instance that the management has counseled the
employee about performance quality. If the discharge results in litigation, the firm's
case will be stronger and more convincing if it reflects occasions when the appropri-
ate supervisor praised and encouraged the employee in addition to necessary in-
358. See Galvin, Taming the Lions in the Street with Title VII, JuRis DOCTOR, Sept. 1976, at 8-11; P. HoFFtAN,
LIONS OF THE Eoirrims 211 (1982).
359. See Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HuM. Rrs. 1, 20 (1977).
360. Id.
361. See K. LAWRENCE, SEx DlscRawsNAmoN IN THE WORKPLACE 100 (1978); Lewis v. Central Piedmont Commu-
nity College, 689 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982).
362. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 n.2 (I 1th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813 (1983).
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stances of admonition.3 63 This type of evaluation implies objective analysis by the
supervisor and eliminates the inference that personal prejudice or animosity was
present between this particular supervisor and the employee. The firm's best defense
is to show that other women have performed satisfactorily and attained partnership
status.364 In Hishon the district court commented, "It is also irrelevant to this opin-
ion, but is somewhat supportive, to note that since the filing of this action King &
Spalding now has a female partner."
365
Although quantitative evidence of the hiring and promotion of other women may
be of questionable significance in a disparate treatment case that focuses on an
individual, courts do examine evidence of general finrn policies. It is easier for a law
firm to prove nondiscriminatory practices if the firn has a history of progressive
attitudes regarding the advancement of women. Courts, however, must closely
scrutinize the evidence presented, to determine whether it portrays a credible picture
of the firm's employment policies. When confronted with an individual case, a court
must examine the firm's policies as they existed when the discrimination is alleged to
have taken place-not what they are at the time of trial. It is too easy for a firm to
implement a few noble gestures in preparation for trial and then revert back to prior
employment practices once the vulnerability of litigation has passed.
B. Appraisal Methods
Law firms must evaluate their personnel policies to determine whether they
operate unfairly against a protected classification of people. The law frmn should
advise all its partners that factors of race, sex, color, religion or national origin are
inappropriate considerations in the selection of new partners.3 66 Title VII is violated
when an employing organization uses discriminatory evaluations of an employee that
were prepared by its own supervisory personnel unless the employee has received a
reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct these evaluations.3 67 Unless law firms
want to subject their employee evaluations to inspection, the law firms must ensure
that discriminatory attitudes do not invade the evaluation procedure. 368 The law firm
should adopt written guidelines for employee evaluations so that the partners can
utilize uniform criteria when making their promotion decisions, thereby reducing the
potential arbitrariness of the critique.
Moreover, these appraisal methods would increase profits and efficiency while
reducing the risk of a Title VII action. The firm's appraisal method should provide
criteria for successful job performance and a measuring process to analyze the results.
Many firms are evaluating associates earlier in their careers and informing them
whether or not they are on "track" for partnership.3 69
363. See K. LAWRENCE, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 110 (1978).
364. Id.
365. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,703, at 20,064 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
366. See Note, Applicability of FederalAntidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L.
Rv. 282, 287 (1978).
367. See Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
368. See supra note 313.
369. See Morrison, Making Partner: Tradition in Flux, NAT'L. L. J., April 12, 1982, at I col. 3.
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The function of a performance appraisal is to (1) provide constructive perform-
ance feedback to each person, (2) serve as a basis for modifying or changing behavior
to achieve more effective working habits, and (3) provide the partnership with objec-
tive data to assist in the judging of future job assignments and compensation. 370 A
law firm can insulate itself from Title VII liability by establishing procedures to allow
employees to screen their personnel files and to remove damaging, discriminatory
information. 37' The law firm must notify its employees, however, that they have the
right to inspect and challenge their evaluations. If a law firm can demonstrate to the
court that an associate has not received good periodic reviews, or has been warned
that he or she was unlikely to achieve partnership status, and has given the associate
the opportunity to review her file, the law finn will have defused significantly the
possibility of an adverse decision in a discrimination case.
C. An Alternative to "Up or Out"
Law firms that maintain an "up or out" policy are highly vulnerable to the Title
VII prohibitions against discriminatory discharge. Law firms are loathe to fire an
associate because the associate generally is bringing some money into the firm, and
the firm may have invested a considerable amount of time and money training the
associate. If the firm continually passed the associate at her periodic reviews in hopes
of better performance in the future, it will be harder to prove nondiscriminatory
treatment in rejecting her for partnership and forcing her to leave the firm.
Because the "up or out" policy has such drastic consequences, many firms are
seeking alternatives. Some firms are allowing their associates to be considered for
partnership more than once while others are allowing the person to stay with the finm
in a "permanent associate" capacity.372 The permanent association plan is feasible
because it addresses some of the criticisms of the partnership process and eliminates
the possibility of discriminatory termination. If the associate is paid the same amount
of money as if she were a partner, she will have lost only the status and a say in the
operations of the firm. In a large firm that is controlled by committees, she will have
lost only the status of partnership. Without any tangible evidence of economic conse-
quence, an associate would have a harder time trying to fit under Title VII. 37 1 In
Hishon the dissenting opinion focused on the result of King & Spalding's up or out
policy and found that because termination was inextricably intertwined with the
policy, Title VII should apply.
374
The development of a permanent associate position within a firm must be closely
scrutinized, however, to ensure that the firm is not formulating a two-track pro-
motional system. A firm obviously could not lawfully restrict its partnership track to
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men simply because it may allow women to be employed as permanent associates.
The law firm cannot establish male and female jobs with differing privileges and
pay. 375 King & Spalding did this with its first female attorney when it kept her in a
permanent associate position for thirty-three years.3 76 Maintaining a permanent asso-
ciate track would be permissible only if the firm did not discriminate in its partnership
promotion decisions. The permanent alsociate theory would keep employees working
for the law firm, though, thus reducing the frequency of potential Title VII suits. The
employee benefits from the system because he or she would retain most of the
benefits that accompany working for the firm, including job security. Although the
associate's compensation may not equal a partner's, at least there would be no
decrease in the salary and periodic raises would be forthcoming.
VII. CONCLUSION
The remainder of the 1980s will bring increasing attention to fair employment
problems in upper level positions. Deadend promotional channels, in conjunction
with generally increasing levels of seniority and relevant job experience of working
women will result in litigation focusing on the upward mobility of women in
organizations.3 77 The partnership decision in law firms will not be immune to litiga-
tion if law firms continue to discriminate against women attorneys. The sexual
stereotypes regarding the competence of women in the legal arena must be abandoned
for a more enlightened approach that befits the 1980s. Qualified women should
advance within the profession and should not be held back by traditional notions that
only men can be competent lawyers.
Courts should be active participants in the continuing evolution of female attor-
neys seeking the opportunities of the legal profession. The courts are responsible for
upholding the mandate of Title VII that discrimination in employment should be
eradicated. Law firms are not immune from this prohibition on discriminatory em-
ployment practices, and courts should not hesitate to subject them to Title VII jur-
isdiction. The Hishon decision effectively created an exception to Title VII jurisdic-
tion. This, however, is contrary to Congress' intent to eliminate employment dis-
crimination on all levels, including the professional positions. In the interest of
justice, the discriminatory approach assumed by law firms and the courts should
emerge as a subject for individual and collective self-examination, including a cri-
tique of the current legal professional style, and a recognition of the need to evolve a
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